The G20 at the end of 2014 by Tristram Sainsbury
  
 
The G20 at the end of 2014 Edited by  
Tristram Sainsbury 
Number 15    |    January 2015 
 
 THE G20 AT THE END OF 2014 
 
  
 
The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy has been provided by the Australian Government. 
 
The views expressed in the contributions to this Monitor are entirely the
authors’ own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy or
of the G20 Studies Centre. 
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OVERVIEW 
TRISTRAM SAINSBURY1 
 
This issue of the G20 Monitor reflects on the state of the G20 at the end 
of 2014, and offers suggestions for the path forward during Turkey’s 
2015 G20 Presidency.  
My paper identifies ambitious policy pursuits that will define a successful 
2015 Presidency. There are also papers outlining the perspectives on 
the state of the G20 from participants in the Think20, the outreach 
grouping of professional G20 observers drawn from academia and think 
tanks that contributes to the G20 through analysis, ideas, and 
commentary.  
Ye Yu suggests that the G20 has evolved positively in the last six years, 
and is the premier forum for international economic cooperation. Jun 
Yokota concludes that the G20 remains the only forum of its kind, 
providing an opportunity for leaders of this grouping of developed and 
developing countries to meet annually and progress international 
economic issues. Katharina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker also 
support this sentiment, but explain that summits have lost their lustre in 
recent years and the G20 needs to be strengthened. Fan He notes that 
Australia has managed to get the G20 back on track, but that the forum 
needs to look beyond the fluctuation of annual growth rates and address 
global governance issues. Stephen Grenville explores the prospect of 
the G20 developing its role over time as a ginger group and steering 
committee for international organisations. Carlos Heredia suggests that 
emerging economic and geopolitical challenges continue to raise fresh 
questions about the identity and role of the G20, while Sergey 
Drobyshevsky cautions against the risk of the G20 drifting from the 
‘economic government’ to just one more international institution dealing 
with international affairs or global security issues. 
Turning to G20 outreach to the broader community, Melissa Conley 
Tyler and Duc Dao explore public perceptions of the Brisbane Summit 
and recall the primary issues that will dominate the domestic Australian 
audience’s memory of the G20. Susan Harris Rimmer explains that the 
G20 narrative is, on the whole, still not resonating with its citizenry, 
despite Australian efforts to strengthen the outreach process in 2014, 
and explores some issues that the Turkish and Chinese presidencies will 
face.  
                                                
1 Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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Focusing on Turkish G20 priorities, Stephen Pickford warns of the 
need for the G20 to prioritise a few key issues in 2015, and identifies 
advances that can be made by a focused agenda. Fariborz Moshirian 
identifies the essential prerequisites that could facilitate the successful 
promotion of the Turkish Presidency’s three I’s (inclusiveness, 
implementation, and investment). Barry Carin examines the case for 
G20 attention on fossil fuel exploration subsidies, and Antonio 
Villafranca explores issues around global economic governance and 
the redistribution of power in international institutions. With China 
confirmed as G20 host for 2016, Yong Wang and Gregory Chin explain 
how the infrastructure agenda will support the G20’s growth goals and 
link with China’s heavy interest in the topic.  
Also included is the summary of a Think20 seminar hosted by the Lowy 
Institute for International Policy’s G20 Studies Centre in Sydney in 
October 2014, which canvassed key issues around the state of the 
global economy, developments in global economic governance, and the 
future of the G20. A specific objective of the seminar’s discussions was 
to identify the successes and lessons of the 2014 Think20 process. 
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POLICIES FOR THE TURKISH 
2015 G20 PRESIDENCY: 
WALKING A TIGHTROPE OF 
G20 RELEVANCY 
TRISTRAM SAINSBURY1 
 
The G20 is in a delicate position at the end of 2014. The global economy 
continues to face significant short- and long-term challenges associated 
with the sluggish recovery from the global financial crisis. The collective 
solutions required to address the broad range of international economic 
challenges often require multi-year negotiations, and today’s integrated 
global economy needs an effective forum for international economic 
cooperation. The latest G20 Leaders’ Summit, held in Brisbane in 
November, provided a welcome reminder of the power of the G20 to 
overcome political roadblocks and for leaders to provide the necessary 
high-level strategic leadership that advances global economic issues. 
The successful 2014 Australian G20 Presidency has brought back a 
sense of optimism that the G20 is able to focus on collective solutions to 
the major economic challenges of the day.  
Yet the G20’s legitimacy as the world’s premier economic forum has 
been increasingly questioned amid claims that it has not always provided 
the economic leadership that is required, and that people have become 
disillusioned with the slow progress being made on key international 
governance issues. A side effect has been the development of alternate 
regional architecture and the formation of geopolitical blocs and factions. 
Many feel that, at the start of 2015, the G20 is a group still in search of 
more substance and permanence. 
The 2015 Presidency provides an opportunity to show that the G20 is 
continuing to play a very positive ongoing role; that governments have 
the capacity and willingness to cooperate; and that non-G8 countries are 
continuing to listen and learn about how to steer global affairs. It is 
important that Turkey’s G20 Presidency is a success, and not just for 
reasons of Turkish national pride. We live in a world of workarounds, and 
alternative forums will continue to be sought if the G20 is not 
demonstrating its relevance. As a result, the G20 will walk a tightrope of 
relevancy in 2015. 
The key challenge that the Turkish G20 Presidency faces is how to 
manage efforts to ‘have it all’. That is, how it can balance advancing the 
                                                
1 Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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G20’s primary objective to lift growth and quality jobs, achieve progress 
on a remarkably broad scope of nominated priorities that appeal to its 
domestic constituency, and make concrete progress on the longer-term 
challenges of global economic governance upon which the G20’s 
reputation ultimately rests. At the same time, it needs to maintain the 
functional process that was a feature of 2014 discussions, pursue a clear 
G20 communications strategy for the broader public, and strengthen 
outreach with engagement groups and non-members, which are vital for 
the longer-term legitimacy and effectiveness of the G20.2 The 
experience of previous presidencies suggests that pursing such a broad 
range of priority topics will be highly challenging, and it will be important 
that Turkey’s public narrative clearly communicates which of the 
priorities it considers indispensable, and how these are in the best 
interests of the G20.  
If the Antalya Summit in November 2015 can make tangible advances in 
tackling longer-term global governance and also consolidate the 
substantial gains made during Australia’s Presidency, it will also go 
some way towards restoring the reputation of the forum. This article will 
identify some of the areas that will make this possible, starting by 
examining the economic context for the Presidency.  
THE G20 IN 2015 FACES SIMILAR ECONOMIC CHALLENGES TO 
2014 
The economic outlook that leaders faced in November 2014 was for low, 
uneven, and disappointing global growth. In October 2014, the IMF 
downgraded its global growth forecasts to 3.3 per cent for 2014 and 3.8 
per cent in 2015.3 Many countries are forecast to grow below their 
potential growth rates, combined with downgrades in growth potential; 
and there has been a marked slowdown in convergence of the growth 
performance between advanced economies and emerging markets.4 
Unemployment in many countries remains uncomfortably and naggingly 
high, particularly for the young and disadvantaged groups. Further, there 
has been a loss of momentum in global trade, monetary policy continues 
to play a prominent and potentially disruptive role in economic 
management, and short-term risks to global growth increased over 2014, 
                                                
2 For further detail on the G20 engagement process in 2014, particularly the Think20 
process, see Susan Harris Rimmer, “Stronger Outreach but G20 Narrative Still Not 
Resonating with Citizenry” in The G20 at the end of 2014, G20 Monitor No. 15, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2015 and Tristram Sainsbury, “Summary of October 
2014 Think20 Seminar,” in The G20 at the end of 2014, G20 Monitor No. 15, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2015.  
3 IMF, World Economic Outlook: Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties, (Washington DC: IMF, 
October 2014).  
4 Ibid. 
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notably associated with concerns that markets continue to misprice risk 
and with ongoing geopolitical tensions.5  
Developments since the Brisbane Summit suggest that growth will 
remain uneven and global recovery prone to significant risks. The IMF 
has assessed that the price of oil, which has now fallen by around 50 per 
cent since June 2014, will provide a net boost to global GDP.6 However, 
the recent conditions in the Russian economy and foreign exchange 
market have highlighted the distributional consequences of the sharp 
fluctuation in oil prices on oil-exporting countries and the heightened 
risks to financial stability.7 Elsewhere, there are signs of strength in the 
US economy and labour markets, an increasing acceptance that we are 
seeing a ‘new normal’ of slower Chinese growth, stagflation in Brazil, 
renewed financial market uncertainty stemming from the Greek 
elections, as well as price deflation in Europe, and growing expectations 
that the ECB will deliver further unconventional monetary policy stimulus. 
Yet there is a sense of familiarity to the overarching economic 
preconditions of sluggish, uneven growth and mounting risks, which 
were also the challenges that influenced the start of Australia’s 
Presidency.8  
A SUCCESSFUL AUSTRALIAN PRESIDENCY 
The response at the start of the Australian Presidency was to drive an 
evolution of the G20 towards a second phase of the forum, focused on 
lifting growth in countries affected by the crisis, and away from the initial 
response to the financial crisis that had dominated the G20 narrative for 
its first five years. This was operationalised through a tight and focused 
narrative centred on two themes: promoting stronger economic growth 
and employment outcomes, and making the global economy more 
resilient to deal with future shocks.  
The thing that stands out has been the clear articulation, then 
achievement, of the G20's goals. The forum made boosting sustained 
economic growth its central objective in 2014, and achieved this aim 
through actions to promote growth, investment, and trade; and build a 
stronger, more resilient economy through actions on energy governance, 
tax, and financial regulation. It also went beyond a narrow rhetoric of 
                                                
5 Tristram Sainsbury, “Summary of October 2014 Think20 Seminar,” in The G20 at the 
end of 2014, G20 Monitor No. 15, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015. 
6 Stephen Grenville, “Oil Drops 50%, World Shrugs,” The Interpreter (blog), 12 January 
2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/01/12/Oil-drops-50-percent-world-
shrugs.aspx. 
7 Rabah Arezki and Olivier Blanchard, “Seven Questions about the Recent Oil Price 
Slump,” iMF direct (blog), 22 December 2014, http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2014/12/22/seven-questions-about-the-recent-oil-price-slump/. 
8 Australian G20 Presidency, G20 2014: Overview of Australia’s Presidency, 1 
December 2013.  
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core economic fundamentals with commitments to put 100 million 
women into jobs, address youth unemployment, and tackle corruption 
through strong principles on beneficial ownership.9  
The broad-ranging outcomes from the Brisbane Summit provided much-
needed momentum to the forum. Coinciding with the important deals 
reached bilaterally on climate change between the US and China and 
trade between the US and India, Brisbane provided a sense that the 
significant global governance challenges we face can be tackled. An 
energetic Australian Presidency has also strengthened habits of 
cooperation within the forum through improvements in managing time, 
the length of speeches, and maintaining the relevancy of the G20 
discussions through peer-to-peer conversations and informality of 
interactions. 
The commentary in the immediate aftermath of the Brisbane Summit 
concluded that Australia had delivered a successful Presidency. 
Respected G20 observer Mike Callaghan noted, in giving the Brisbane 
Summit a tick of approval, that the G20 produced substantial outcomes 
broadly in line with what was predicted would be necessary for Brisbane 
to be called a success.10 The Australian press, civil society and business 
groups hailed the Summit as a victory and there was broad 
acknowledgement of the contribution of various engagement groups to 
the final communique.11  
Commentaries generally acknowledge that the extent of the Australian 
Presidency’s achievements in 2014 will only be fully determined in years 
to come, once it becomes clear if the campaign to lift G20 growth by 2 
per cent by 2018 is achieved, the Global Infrastructure Hub becomes a 
known entity, and the multi-year agenda on tax, financial regulation, 
climate change, trade, energy, and IMF reform progresses further.12 
Thomas Bernes and Mike Callaghan argue that the real question is 
whether leaders will be able to deliver on these commitments.13  
                                                
9 Tristram Sainsbury, “Taking Advantage of Australia’s G20 Moment,” The Interpreter 
(blog), 28 November 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/11/28/Taking-
advantage-of-Australias-G20-moment.aspx. 
10 Mike Callaghan, “Brisbane G20 Summit a Success, Despite Australia’s Climate 
Misstep,” The Interpreter (blog), 16 November 2014, 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/11/16/Brisbane-G20-summit-success-despite-
Australias-climate-misstep.aspx. 
11 Bill Scales, “Everyone's Gone Home. So Was it a Success?,” G20 Watch (blog), 
http://g20watch.edu.au/everyones-gone-home-so-was-it-success; Petrina Berry; “Civil 
Society Groups Hail G20 a Success,” AAP via The Courier-Mail, 16 November 2014, 
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/breaking-news/civil-society-groups-hail-g20-a-
success/story-fnihsfrf-1227124852436?nk=7d832ed381d61cf4fc97220631abf83e. 
12 Tristram Sainsbury, “Taking Advantage of Australia’s G20 Moment.” 
13 Thomas Bernes, “If Fully Implemented…,” Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, 17 November 2014, https://www.cigionline.org/publications/if-fully-
implemented; Callaghan, “Brisbane G20 Summit a Success.”  
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THE G20 FACES ONGOING QUESTIONS OF RELEVANCE 
Although it was able to get the G20 back on track, the Brisbane Summit 
was not able to banish the overriding sense that the state of the G20, 
and global governance generally, has been in decline in recent years as 
the immediacy of the global financial crisis has subsided. People have 
become disillusioned and increasingly cynical as the G20 has delivered 
slower and lower levels of progress.  
Problems in areas such as the Bali trade agreement and IMF reform 
have contributed to the formation of blocs in the international community, 
with three main groupings emerging: the BRICS grouping (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa); the G7 (US, Canada, Germany, 
UK, Japan, France, and Italy); and more recently MITKA (Mexico, 
Indonesia, Turkey, Korea, and Australia). There is the potential for these 
blocs to work against global economic cooperation and impede 
achievement of the necessary compromises that advance international 
issues, making the task of future G20 presidents harder. 
Recent years have also seen clear signals from emerging market 
economies, and China in particular, of their capacity to develop an 
alternate financial architecture, particularly through the BRICS New 
Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The 
ongoing evolution of these arrangements, and their interaction with the 
existing financial architecture, will influence the G20’s reputation as the 
premier forum for bringing together advanced and emerging economies 
to progress collective economic outcomes. 
Many still feel that the G20 is in search of permanence and substance, 
and that nothing short of a fundamental shake-up in its priorities will 
achieve this. For example, Fan, Gnath and Schmucker argue that the 
G20’s very focus on nation-specific issues such as growth strategies, 
employment and infrastructure is misplaced, as it overlooks an important 
feature of the G20 — its informal nature — which limits its direct 
influence at a national policy level.14 They urge that future G20 attention 
should be more appropriately directed towards long-term cross-border 
governance issues in international forum and global institutions. Such a 
focus would place a high priority in 2015 on tax cooperation; overcoming 
political deadlocks in multilateral trade; reforming international financial 
institutions; financial regulation, and greater political impetus on 
international coordination and better global standards. 
                                                
14 Katarina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker, “Group with a Cause: There is no alternative 
to the G20, but it does need reform” in The G20 at the end of 2014, G20 Monitor No. 15, 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015; and Fan He, “Back on Track” in The G20 at 
the end of 2014, G20 Monitor No. 15, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015. 
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TURKEY’S APPROACH: THREE PILLARS AND THREE I’S 
Ahead of the Brisbane G20 Leaders’ Summit, Prime Minister Davutoglu 
foreshadowed that the Turkish Presidency would pursue a broad agenda 
of seven priorities: Development, Trade, Employment, Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs), Investment, Energy and Climate 
Change.15 In addition to these, Turkey would continue to progress 
Australia’s multi-year agenda, such as tax and growth strategies. On 
assuming the Presidency on 1 December 2014, Turkey outlined that it 
will organise G20 discussions along three main ‘pillars’:16  
• Strengthening recovery and lifting potential: growth strategies; 
investment; employment; and trade 
• Enhancing resilience: international financial regulation; international 
financial architecture; tax; and anti-corruption 
• Buttressing sustainability: development; energy; and climate 
change finance 
The Turkish Presidency also indicated that it will place a special 
emphasis on the ‘three I’s’ of Inclusiveness, Implementation, and 
Investment. In opening discussions by officials in Istanbul in mid-
December, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ali 
Babacan outlined that the inclusiveness agenda will focus on the voice 
of low-income countries, small and medium enterprises, and reform of 
the governance arrangements at the IMF; the implementation agenda 
will focus on growth strategies, particularly establishing a robust 
monitoring framework; and the investment agenda will look to introduce 
a new narrative to address investment gaps of member countries via 
concrete and ambitious investment strategies.17 
In all, Turkey has delivered a useful sense of continuity, picking up all the 
main elements of the 2014 discussions and demonstrating a firm 
commitment to drive forwards on the core ‘growth and jobs, and 
resilience’ thematic structure that the Australian Presidency successfully 
pursued. As has become the norm for a new host, it has expanded upon 
the rhetorical scope of the agenda. 2015 will see renewed interest in the 
‘sustainability’ topics, and elevated importance to topics, such as a focus 
on small and medium enterprises, that are of domestic significance. 
                                                
15 Tristram Sainsbury, “Turkey Sets its G20 Agenda for 2015,” The Interpreter (blog), 14 
November 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/11/14/Turkey-sets-its-G20-
agenda-for-2015.aspx?COLLCC=2460656200&.  
16 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014. 
17 Turkish G20 Presidency, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan’s Speech at the G20 
Sherpa Meeting, 15 December 2015.  
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However, the messaging has come across as somewhat haphazard and 
has failed to deliver a sense of what Turkey’s central objective is. 
Further, the broad scope of agenda is prone to criticism that we are 
witnessing a re-emergence of a proliferating agenda which could 
translate into the ‘bad old days’ of laundry-list communiqués that are 
tens of pages long. G20 political capital is limited, and a political and 
economic case still needs to be made for pursuing just a few specific, 
tangible, and realistic outcomes, tied together in a simple, coherent 
public narrative. The first Finance Ministers’ Meeting, to be held in 
Istanbul in early February, will be crucial in resetting the tone for the 
remainder of the 2015 Presidency. 
The following identifies the sort of specific, tangible, and realistic 
outcomes in each of the workstreams that would contribute towards a 
successful 2015 Presidency. 
GROWTH STRATEGIES: 
The overarching objective of the G20 remains to support global growth, 
create quality jobs and deliver sustained increases in wages and living 
standards. In Sydney in February 2014, G20 finance ministers and 
central bank governors outlined an ambition to take the actions 
necessary to lift the G20's GDP by at least an additional 2 per cent by 
2018. In Brisbane, leaders declared success against their first five-year 
growth plan by citing IMF-OECD analysis that indicated that the more 
than 1000 actions members committed to take over the year, if fully 
implemented, would deliver a 2.1 per cent GDP boost by 2018 and 
create millions of jobs.  
With the OECD and IMF determining the growth commitment to be 
achievable, the focus in 2015 will be on implementation, and ensuring 
that substantive progress is recorded on actually achieving the G20’s 
ambition. At Antalya the G20 will need to demonstrate how much of the 
‘more than 2 per cent’ has been delivered since Brisbane, and explain 
what further steps will need to be taken in future years. Despite the best 
of intentions, it is clear that not all 1000+ measures will be implemented, 
and further measures will need to be announced.18 Given its central 
position in the G20’s narrative, the growth strategies are also central to 
the credibility of the G20.  
Ultimately, the G20’s credibility will be judged on how well the 1000+ 
commitments translate into IMF/OECD forecasts, and then actual on-
the-ground actions. It can be expected that the IMF and OECD will only 
forecast the impact of policies they are confident will actually contribute 
                                                
18 Josh Frydenburg, “Australia’s G20 agenda and the case for improved global 
governance,” (speech to The G20 Brisbane Pre-Summit Conference: Strengthening 
Global Growth, 14 November 2014), 
http://www.joshfrydenberg.com.au/guest/SpeechesDetails.aspx?id=266. 
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to GDP. It is instructive that the October 2014 IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) did not attribute a GDP impact to G20 efforts, despite 
more than 90 per cent of measures being known to the IMF via the 
September 2014 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Cairns.19 The downward 
revisions in the World Bank’s economic outlook in January did not 
recognise the contribution of collective G20 actions, which suggests that 
the growth strategies are not expected to deliver substantial real GDP 
outcomes as yet.20 Questions will need to be asked if the G20’s 
commitments are still not even beginning to translate into stronger 
growth forecasts by the next IMF WEO in April, which will mark 18 
months from the October 2013 baseline for the target.  
In all, the growth agenda shapes as a key test for the Turkish 
Presidency, which will need to be proactive in urging leaders and finance 
ministers to continue to take personal ownership for their countries’ 
contribution to the target, their measures’ delivery, and to making 
adjustments to their growth strategies as necessary.  
A welcome development in Brisbane was that G20 countries said that 
they will be held accountable for their performance and called on the IMF 
and OECD to monitor and report on their progress in implementing their 
commitments. To add further rigour and transparency to the 
accountability assessments, G20 members should consider inviting 
Think20 representatives to work alongside the international 
organisations in assessing members’ commitments. 
INFRASTRUCTURE:  
Infrastructure investment is a long-standing challenge facing all G20 
governments, with the size of the global financing requirement often 
cited as an additional $US70 trillion by 2030.21 It has, unsurprisingly, 
been a consistent focus of G20 attention and commitments, and both 
Australia and Turkey have nominated it as a key focus of their respective 
presidencies. Another longstanding challenge, though, has been in 
developing concrete proposals that allow the G20 to move beyond 
rhetoric and undertake actions that actually increase infrastructure 
investment.  
The Australian Presidency’s agenda focused on investment actions; 27 
per cent of the growth target is expected to come from investment and 
                                                
19 Australian Treasurer, the Hon. Joe Hockey MP, “Treasurer’s Closing Statement, G20 
Finance Ministers And Central Bank Governors Meeting,” (speech, Cairns, 21 
September 2014).  
20 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects: Having Fiscal Space and Using It, 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, January 2015). 
21 OECD, Private Financing and Government Support to Promote Long-term 
Investments in Infrastructure, (Paris: 10 September 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Private-financing-and-government-support-
to-promote-LTI-in-infrastructure.pdf. 
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infrastructure measures.22 In September, finance ministers also 
announced the multi-year Global Infrastructure Initiative to facilitate 
higher public and private investment, particularly in quality infrastructure 
and SMEs. In Brisbane, leaders followed this announcement by 
establishing a Global Infrastructure Hub in Sydney to develop a 
knowledge-sharing platform, address data gaps, and develop a 
consolidated database of infrastructure projects connected to national 
databases, to help match potential investors with projects.23  
Babacan’s pledge to officials in December that the G20 will introduce a 
new narrative to address investment bottlenecks and gaps via concrete 
and ambitious country-specific investment strategies has the potential to 
be a valuable addition to the workstream. Improving investment remains 
an acute goal for several G20 countries, with the IMF suggesting that 
public investment, particularly in infrastructure, should be increased by ½ 
per cent of GDP in the United States, Germany, Brazil, India, and 
Indonesia as part of their contributions to the G20’s growth target.24 
Although investment may not be the main growth challenge faced by all 
G20 members, all members will benefit from tailored strategies that 
improve the quality of investment. It will also allow for a focus on building 
the evidence base for practical domestic actions to facilitate quality 
investment in SMEs, complementing efforts to encourage market 
sources of finance and transparent securitisation. 
The Turkish Presidency will also need to focus on implementation of the 
Global Infrastructure Hub, and convincing a sceptical global audience 
that this initiative can make a substantive contribution towards 
addressing the global infrastructure challenge. With just a four-year 
mandate and questions persisting over its role vis-à-vis the World Bank’s 
Global Infrastructure Facility, the Hub does not have much time to 
demonstrate its value. Starting as a small pilot program, it is important 
that it makes demonstrable progress in 2015 and delivers tangible 
outcomes to leaders by the Antalya Summit. Goals for 2015 should be 
for the consolidated database of infrastructure projects to be made 
accessible to G20 members, reports of firm steps in the development of 
the knowledge-sharing platform and network of those involved in 
infrastructure projects, and for leaders to be presented with clear, albeit 
preliminary, examples in which the Hub has matched investors with 
appropriate projects. Operational arrangements for the Hub, including 
the CEO and staffing, should be announced as soon as possible.  
                                                
22 IMF and OECD, Quantifying the Impact of G-20 Members’ Growth Strategies, report 
delivered to G20 Brisbane Leaders’ Summit, November 2014. 
23 G20, G20 Note on the Global Infrastructure Initiative, November 2014.  
24 IMF, Note on Global Prospects and Policy Challenges, report delivered to G20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, February 2014.  
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In what will be an active workstream, it appears that the Turkish 
Presidency will also focus on public-private partnerships (PPPs). In 
December, Deputy Prime Minister Babacan indicated to G20 officials 
that Turkey has already asked the World Bank to study how to 
standardise these projects and make them easier to securitise, with a 
particular emphasis on affordability, feasibility, and risk sharing. As Mike 
Callaghan noted, it will be important to keep the use of PPPs in 
perspective, and finance ministers should signal that decisions to use a 
PPP should rest on whether it would result in lower production costs, 
better maintenance, and a higher level of service than investment by 
public funds alone.25 
EMPLOYMENT: 
The Brisbane Summit was significant for G20 efforts on employment. 
The IMF and OECD assessed that measures to boost employment are 
the single greatest contributor to the 2 per cent growth target, 
representing 30 per cent of efforts.26 Yet amidst a persistently and 
disappointingly high unemployment outlook in many countries, leaders 
stated that the G20 must do more to address unemployment, raise 
participation, and create quality jobs.27 Turkey has pledged to work with 
international organisations in 2015 to understand the factors behind the 
jobless growth phenomenon and initiate a discussion on labour income 
as a share of GDP.28  
In the policy response to overcoming these challenges, Turkey is 
maintaining the approach adopted in previous presidencies that actions 
be included in members’ growth strategies and country employment 
plans, recognising that labour solutions need to be tailored to country-
specific settings. Labour markets are complex and there are no easy 
answers to these challenges. Solutions need to reflect the diversity of 
groups such as women, young people, and the disabled; as well as 
providing incentives, removing impediments, and enhancing 
opportunities for the most vulnerable. A good outcome for 2015 would be 
to continue to see these aspects incorporated appropriately in each 
country’s growth strategies and employment plan, and implemented 
accordingly.  
Along with a renewed focus on putting people into jobs generally, the 
Brisbane communiqué committed to reducing the gap between male and 
female participation in G20 countries by 25 per cent by 2025, estimated 
                                                
25 Mike Callaghan, G20 Brisbane Summit Form Guide: What Will Make the Summit a 
Success?, Lowy Institute Analysis, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
October 2014).  
26 IMF and OECD, Quantifying the Impact of G-20 Members’ Growth Strategies. 
27 Brisbane G20 Leaders Summit Communiqué, November 2014.  
28 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014.  
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to bring more than 100 million women into the labour force, and targeted 
youth unemployment by ensuring young people are in education, 
training, or employment. There is scope for further ambitious 
commitments in these areas in 2015, such as by setting targets for youth 
employment. Ultimately, these will need to translate into actions, so the 
G20 will also need to outline a timetable for meeting the grand 10-year 
commitment to increase female participation, and should develop 
country action plans dedicated to unleashing the power of young 
entrepreneurs, start-ups, and small and medium enterprises.  
TRADE LIBERALISATION:  
The Brisbane Summit saw some life breathed back into the multilateral 
trade agenda, mainly on the back of the agreement between the US and 
India on trade facilitation that allowed leaders to commit to implement all 
elements of the Bali package.29 Leaders were also able to commit to 
defining a World Trade Organization (WTO) work program on remaining 
issues of the Doha Development agenda, which will be developed by 
July 2015.30  
Despite these developments, trade remains in a shaky place. Trade 
growth numbers of 3.1 per cent in 2014 and 4 per cent in 2015 may be 
greater than recent years, but they remain significantly lower than long-
term average growth rates.31 Countries continue to look at bilateral and 
regional arrangements, notwithstanding that these deals may be 
inconsistent with a trading system dominated by global value chains and 
goods that are ‘made in the world’.32 A regional focus also ignores the 
many large trade issues that are best tackled in multilateral forums, such 
as trade facilitation, financial liberalisation, telecommunication 
liberalisation, and farming subsidies. 
In October, and in light of the paralysis on Bali negotiations that emerged 
in the months leading up to the US/India deal, WTO Director-General 
Robert Azevedo lamented that the trade facilitation deadlock was not an 
uncommon scenario for the organisation, and sought to open 
conversations on the future of the ‘negotiating pillar’ of the WTO — the 
rules that govern decision-making in the body. G20 leaders 
subsequently agreed that they would discuss ways to make the 
multilateral trading system work better in Antalya. This is encouraging, 
although the process should be accelerated, starting by making a review 
                                                
29 Brisbane G20 Leaders’ Summit Communiqué, November 2014.  
30 Roberto Azevedo, “Let’s Make Sure 2015 Will Be a Year to Remember for the WTO,” 
(speech to WTO General Council, 10 December 2014), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/gc_rpt_10dec14_e.htm. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Mike Callaghan, “The WTO is in Big Trouble,” The Interpreter (blog), 20 October 
2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/20/The-WTO-is-in-
trouble.aspx?COLLCC=543343775&. 
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of the WTO’s operations a clear G20 priority for 2015, with finance 
ministers in Istanbul calling on the WTO to provide leaders with an 
options paper that assesses current failings in WTO process and actions 
that G20 countries can take to improve WTO decision-making. Leaders 
should look to provide high-level direction to WTO negotiators on desired 
changes in the WTO’ negotiating pillar in Antalya. 
G20 members could also look to put the power of trade liberalisation 
behind the efforts to control climate change. As part of this, the G20 
could build on APEC’s decision to liberalise trade in environmental 
goods and services and ask the OECD and the United Nations 
Environment Programme to define genuine green trade.  
In all, 2015 is shaping as a pivotal year for the WTO, and trade is an 
area that could feature prominently in G20 discussions. 
FINANCIAL REGULATION:  
The financial regulatory agenda enters its seventh year, and despite 
optimistic claims that the agenda was substantially completed in 2014, 
financial regulation will continue to occupy a fair degree of ministers’ and 
officials’ time in 2015. The key item will still be for leaders to agree by the 
Antalya Summit on the last major outstanding piece of the regulatory 
reform puzzle: requiring ‘too big to fail’ globally systemic banks to hold 
enough capital so that creditors bear losses in the event of their failure, 
rather than taxpayer bailouts being needed. 
Ahead of the Brisbane Summit, it became clear that Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) would propose that globally systemic banks maintain a 
capital base of 16-20 per cent. FSB Chair Mark Carney has described 
the proposal as “a watershed in ending ‘too big to fail’ for banks. Once 
implemented, these agreements will play important roles in enabling 
globally systemic banks to be resolved without recourse to public 
subsidy and without disruption to the wider financial system.”33 
Encouragingly, leaders also committed that the proposal will be subject 
to public consultation and a quantitative impact assessment before a 
final measure is agreed at Antalya. The degree to which the proposal 
survives the public consultation and impact assessment processes may 
determine how successful the financial regulatory agenda is seen to be 
in 2015. 
G20 finance ministers and central bank governors will also continue to 
monitor progress on reforms, particularly in shadow banking and for 
over-the-counter derivatives markets. Consistent with a post-crisis 
phase, the financial regulatory agenda really needs to focus on the 
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monitoring of, and response to, emerging risks, and 2015 would be 
significant if disciplined communiqués focused more on the overarching 
narrative of how the financial sector is contributing to economic growth, 
the evolving outlook for the sector’s risks, and the acknowledgement of 
major policy milestones; and were no longer filled with references to 
relatively routine updates to the policy framework.  
Emphasis also needs to be placed on implementation; 2015 will see the 
first consolidated annual reporting by the FSB on global implementation 
of financial regulatory reforms and their effects. It will also see the FSB 
and other international standard setting bodies’ plans to publish 
information on their processes for policy development and 
implementation reviews. How the G20 acknowledges underperformance 
and whether members or institutions ‘own’ this failure is a perennial 
question for the credibility of the G20 in advancing meaningful reforms.  
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: 
In 2010, the G20 agreed to a series of reforms to the IMF’s quota and 
governance arrangements. These reforms aim to increase the voice and 
representation of fast-growing emerging markets in IMF decision-
making, and are an important step towards ensuring that global 
economic governance decisions reflect economic realities. However, 
their implementation has been repeatedly blocked by the US Congress 
(the only key remaining member to do so and with a veto power on 
decision-making), which has damaged the credibility of the IMF and 
brought the value of a ‘G20 commitment’ into question. Frustrated with 
the lack of progress, emerging market economies, and China in 
particular, have loudly signalled their capacity to develop workarounds to 
the existing financial architecture, such as the BRICS New Development 
Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
Turkey has signalled that it will place a high priority on progressing the 
2010 reforms during its Presidency, with Babacan advising G20 finance 
deputies that “we should preserve the spirit of the 2010 Reform and 
deliver as much as possible on the gains of dynamic, emerging and 
developing countries. Besides, a plausible option could only constitute 
an interim solution that aims to ease the resentment from the long 
delayed implementation of the Reform. Our primary aim should remain 
as to implement the 2010 Reform eventually.” 34 
In April 2014, G20 finance ministers called on the IMF to develop options 
for next steps if the latest deadline for US implementation (December 
2014) was not met.35 With prospects under the new US Congress 
                                                
34 Turkish G20 Presidency, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan’s Speech at the G20 
Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting, https://g20.org/deputy-prime-minister-ali-
babacans-speech-g20-finance-central-bank-deputies-meeting/. 
35 G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ communiqué, April 2014.  
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appearing more unlikely than ever, the IMF will have circulated these 
options to members for discussion in the lead-up to the Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting in Istanbul in February. Possible ‘Plan B’ options 
include so-called de-linking of the package of IMF reforms with the aim 
to ‘banking’ parts of the 2010 package that have already received a 
sufficient majority, and making ad hoc increases to the quotas of 
underrepresented emerging markets in a way that does not necessitate 
US congressional approval.  
If US implementation of reforms remains unattainable, the G20 should 
focus on a relatively modest Plan B, recognising that the US veto can 
prevent any substantive alternatives that undermine its position at the 
IMF from being brought into force. In addition, the Turkish Presidency 
should seek commitments that assure the broader community that 
decision-making at the IMF remains even-handed, and start 
conversations about IMF resourcing and the $US460 billion in temporary 
bilateral loans that will expire by the end of 2016. The G20 should also 
continue to explore options to strengthen IMF and regional financial 
safety net cooperation.  
As part of efforts on the international financial architecture, Turkey 
should also push for concrete progress towards a more effective 
sovereign debt restructuring framework. The topic emerged in G20 
communiqués in September 2014, although international discussions on 
prospective enhancements to the sovereign debt restructuring 
framework have been taking place for years. Notably, in April 2013 the 
IMF assessed that recent sovereign debt restructurings, such as those in 
Greece, have been ‘too little, too late’ and have often failed in their 
primary objective: to re-establish a country’s ability to access financial 
markets in a durable way.36 The recent Argentinian debt default also 
highlighted the challenges that so-called ‘vulture fund’ litigation poses, 
and the need to strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the 
sovereign debt restructuring process.  
The G20 has so far favoured the approach of strengthening the 
contractual (rather than statutory) framework underpinning debt 
restructurings. In Brisbane, leaders welcomed the international work on 
strengthened collective action and clarification of pari passu clauses and 
encouraged their adoption.37 In an encouraging development, countries 
are starting to do this. Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam have recently 
issued bonds as per the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) 
templates, and euro zone countries have adopted the ‘dual limb’ 
                                                
36 IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implications for the 
Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, IMF Policy Paper, (Washington, DC: IMF, April 
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aggregation clauses advocated by ICMA since January 2014.38 
However, with $US900 billion of foreign-law sovereign bonds 
outstanding and with 29 per cent of these with maturities longer than 10 
years, the new clauses will take many years to gradually phase in.39 
Whilst international community adoption of stronger contracts is a 
commendable approach, it, and modest changes to the IMF lending 
framework, will not be enough to prevent another case such as that seen 
in Greece. Turkey needs to drive discussions on more active steps that 
the G20 can take to strengthen the restructuring process. In the absence 
of firm G20 leadership on the topic, energies will continue to be devoted 
to alternate mechanisms such as UN proposals for a legal framework for 
sovereign debt restructuring, that are doomed to fail as they are opposed 
by the US and UK (the jurisdictions in which most international debt is 
issued). This is not in the interest of global policy-making. 
INTERNATIONAL TAX: 
An increasing priority for the G20 in recent years has been ensuring the 
fairness of the international tax system and the security of countries’ 
revenue bases. Since 2013, policy efforts have focused on modernising 
international tax systems in order to end bank secrecy and prevent 
globally operating firms shifting profits to low- or no-tax jurisdictions. The 
two-year initiative has already seen the announcement of a Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS) for the automatic exchange of tax 
information, with G20 countries to exchange information automatically 
with one another by 2018. This will help end bank secrecy and tackle tax 
evasion by individuals, and is a significant achievement. 
Turkey’s 2015 Presidency will oversee the delivery of the final eight 
items in the two-year, fifteen-point BEPS action plan. It will be an 
instructive year in tax. Many of the difficult issues on the agenda are still 
to be addressed, including the transparency of taxpayer-specific rulings 
found to constitute harmful tax packages, and country-by-country 
reporting of the pricing of transfers within companies. Success will see 
great steps made towards tackling tax evasion by multinational 
companies, which have provided the biggest and most high-profile cases 
of tax evasion globally. Proactive involvement by the Turkish Presidency 
will be needed to guarantee that the momentum and achievements 
through 2013 and 2014 continue to translate into commitments in 
communiqués on issues that will facilitate compromise.  
                                                
38 International Capital Market Association, “Standard Collective Action and Pari Passu 
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The Turkish (and Chinese) Presidency will also need to lead a narrative 
on the longer-term tax agenda. It is likely that countries will begin to 
amend their domestic laws in 2015 to implement the OECD 
recommendations, such as a ‘multilateral instrument’ that the OECD 
claims will amend over 3000 bilateral tax agreements at once. These 
agreements may take years to come into force, and the G20 will need to 
set ambitious but realistic timeframes for the implementation of agreed 
changes over the coming years.  
More generally, though, the BEPS project needs to be viewed as just the 
start of a broader fundamental change in international tax governance 
arrangements. Corporate tax evasion and avoidance are ongoing 
concerns and G20 actions will need to be reviewed regularly to ensure 
international tax standards keep pace with complex global business 
operations and evolving technological developments. An ambitious 
outcome at Antalya would be to reach agreement on a new, permanent 
international tax organisation that could manage country-by-country 
reporting on tax issues. 
Turkey has made the inclusiveness of international tax system 
improvements, developing countries’ perspectives in the tax agenda, 
and bilateral and multilateral cooperation between tax authorities an 
important aspect of its agenda. 2015 will need to see tangible progress 
in assisting low-income countries to meet G20 standards, without 
undermining their limited tax administration capacity. 
ANTI-CORRUPTION: 
Fighting corruption remains an ongoing objective of the G20, and with 
corruption a high-profile domestic issue within China, this is a topic that 
is likely to become more prominent as 2015 progresses. The Brisbane 
Summit saw the successful adoption of the High Level Principles on 
Beneficial Ownership Transparency. The principles commit governments 
to ensuring that information about the real identities of owners of 
corporations, trusts, and other legal entities is kept and made available 
to authorities internationally. In 2015, the G20 should build on this 
success by committing to extend the identity information kept to cover 
those who deal with the companies, corporations and trusts, and 
ambitiously committing to develop public registers of this information.  
Brisbane also saw the agreement to a new two-year G20 Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan for 2015-16, which broadens the G20’s anti-corruption work 
to encompass a wider integrity and transparency agenda, on top of the 
‘hard’ corruption activities of foreign bribery or siphoning off of public 
assets.40 The G20 should continue to look to add value to the existing 
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anti-corruption efforts of multilateral institutions, such as the OECD and 
UN, recognising the comparative advantage of different international 
institutions. G20 discussions in 2015 could also focus on the effective 
implementation of anti-corruption commitments and the evaluation of 
country efforts. Finance ministers could ask the OECD/UN to report to 
leaders on members’ progress in implementing the anti-corruption 
agenda, starting with the beneficial ownership principles, to supplement 
current self-assessment and self-reporting processes.  
DEVELOPMENT: 
One thing that stood out from Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s 
initial speech was that development concerns would be front and centre 
of the Turkish G20 Presidency. The promise is to further enhance the 
integration of developing and low-income countries into the world 
economy through concrete and growth-oriented actions, including by 
examining innovative ways to enhance the contributions of the private 
sector in development. A coherent G20 growth narrative must account 
for the contribution of developing economies to stronger global growth 
and global economic resilience. A challenge will be for the Turkish 
Presidency to articulate what concrete growth actions it sees necessary 
to progress development objectives, whilst communicating that the G20 
continues to deliver substantive advancements on core growth and 
resilience agenda items. 
Despite progress in recent years on some aspects of the development 
agenda, such as food security, remittances, and efforts to promote 
financial inclusion, the development agenda remains largely a diffuse 
add-on to the core G20 agenda, disconnected from the central concerns 
of leaders and finance ministers. A substantive outcome in 2015 would 
be the ‘mainstreaming’ of development considerations within the G20, in 
recognition that the substantive policy prescriptions for development — 
such as trade access, infrastructure, agricultural development, tax policy, 
education and human resources development, commodity and food 
price volatility, and anti-corruption — are not wielded by development 
ministers. As a consequence, the role of the Development Working 
Group should be re-characterised to, as its primary responsibility, 
provide quality input of development perspectives into other 
workstreams, with a mandate to be a loud advocate for development 
interests.  
A clear mainstreaming of a development issue would be to focus finance 
ministers’ attention on addressing health governance gaps, and at the 
same time addressing one of the emerging issues that occupied finance 
ministers and leaders’ time in the final three months of 2014. In their 
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Brisbane communiqué and statement on Ebola, leaders expressed deep 
concern over the humanitarian and economic impact of the Ebola 
outbreak, recognised the coordinated global efforts to combat the 
epidemic and ensure economic recovery, and committed to do all they 
could to contain and respond to the crisis.41 In welcome news, the head 
of the UN global response now expects that new cases in the Ebola 
outbreak will drop to zero by the close of 2015, and has described the 
coordinated emergency response as highly successful.42 In time, the 
focus of the Ebola response will shift away from emergency containment 
and towards ensuring economic recovery in affected nations. 
International organisations, particularly the World Bank, African 
Development Bank, and the IMF will lead the international communities’ 
actions to promote economic recovery, and G20 members will also play 
an important individual role in assisting affected West African nations. 
Further, the Ebola outbreak has demonstrated that the world — and 
particularly low-income and developing countries — remains ill-prepared 
to respond to any severe, global, sustained, and threatening public 
health emergency. Now, while the memory of how close it came to 
causing devastating global confidence is still fresh, is the best time to 
initiate action to fix the fundamental deficiencies it (and similar recent 
infectious disease emergencies such as Avian Influenza and SARS) 
exposed in global health governance. In particular, the G20 should look 
to address the market failures it exposed in discovering and developing 
medicines, vaccines, and diagnostic tests for infectious diseases that 
disproportionately kill the world’s poor, and fix gaps in the multilateral 
health architecture, particularly deficiencies in the operation of the World 
Health Organization and global and regional health surveillance. 
In addition, in the event that UN negotiations on the set of post-2015 
Millennium Development Goals fail to deliver a clear and coherent 
outcome, G20 leaders should be prepared to provide necessary 
direction for subsequent UN negotiations, recognising that the G20 
should not be the forum for negotiating new post-2015 goals.  
ENERGY:  
It is clear that current global energy governance arrangements are not 
working in the interests of all. Current arrangements, which were largely 
developed due to the oil shocks of the 1970s with the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) at their centre, are fragmented and do not reflect 
the significant transformation in energy markets of recent years, 
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particularly the growing role played by emerging markets.43 A major 
factor that the IMF attributed to the 40 per cent decline in global oil prices 
between September and December 2014 was the publicly announced 
intention of Saudi Arabia, the biggest OPEC oil producer, to not cut 
supply in response to the steadily increasing supply of oil globally, and 
the subsequent decisions by OPEC (and other oil producers) to maintain 
production levels in spite of a perceived glut.44  
The Turkish Presidency has an opportunity to build upon what could 
prove to be one of the most substantial and unsung developments 
coming from the Brisbane Summit: a decision to bring together energy 
ministers from G20 nations to work on options to implement the nine 
agreed G20 principles of energy collaboration.45 This decision will bring 
together major global energy producers and consumers for discussions 
on redesigning the international energy architecture. Turkey should push 
for an ambitious timetable for future energy negotiations, and for scope 
to pursue actions that facilitate well-functioning, open, competitive, 
efficient, stable, and transparent energy markets, underpinned by 
improved publicly-available data and analysis. 
Low oil prices have provided an unexpected bonus to policy-making: the 
impetus for G20 members to finally address so-called ‘inefficient’ fossil 
fuel subsidies. It is difficult to overestimate the destructive effect that 
fossil fuel subsidies have on the budgets of those who provide them — 
for example, in Indonesia in 2008, combined subsidies for fuel and 
electricity were estimated to total 4.5 per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of 
total government spending.46 Yet the subsidies have proven stubbornly 
tough policies to address domestically. The tide began to turn in 
October, when Indian Prime Minister Modi eliminated state controls on 
diesel prices for the first time in a decade. In welcome news, the petrol 
price in Indonesia is, from 1 January 2015, reflecting global market 
prices for the first time in decades. The decision is estimated to boost 
Indonesia growth and free up to $16 billion in budget space.47 The 
February Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Istanbul could be the ideal 
timeframe for G20 members to welcome these positive developments 
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and demonstrate their intent to finally deliver on a commitment that was 
originally made by leaders in 2009 in Pittsburgh. 
2015 will also need to maintain momentum on the Energy Efficiency 
Action plan, in which the G20 acknowledged that it would focus on ‘next 
priorities’ of vehicle energy efficiency, networked devices, enhancing 
capital flows to energy efficiency investments, improving metrics and 
performance for buildings, industrial energy management, and electricity 
generation.48 With the energy sector contributing two-thirds of carbon 
emissions, firm commitments on increasing fuel quality and reducing 
carbon emissions by heavy-duty industries in time for the Antalya 
Summit would make a valuable addition to the 2015 climate agenda.  
CLIMATE CHANGE: 
Climate change could become the defining issue of 2015 and COP21, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) conference that will take place in Paris in December 2015, 
has the potential to define the future of global efforts in this important 
field. The UNFCCC discussions in Paris will consequently loom large 
over leaders’ discussions in Antalya in 2015. Davutoglu’s powerful 
rhetoric in Brisbane that: “on most issues we act as the heads of nation 
states, but on climate change we should act as the ministers of home 
affairs for humanity,” suggests that this will also be an important 
domestic issue for Turkey. 
The key question for the G20 is how it can add value to the United 
Nations negotiations. The experience of COP20 in Lima and the 
chequered history of global climate change negotiations show that 
reaching an international agreement on reducing emissions is very 
difficult. Political leadership is needed, and the G20 provides an avenue 
to demonstrate this leadership, given its membership includes all of the 
world’s largest emitters. A consensus from the G20 that provides 
strategic direction on several key conditions for a climate agreement, just 
weeks out from the Paris meeting, would make a major contribution 
towards a successful outcome. Such a consensus result will not be easy, 
but it needs to be attempted.  
But as any casual observer in Australia would have noted, the climate 
change language was among the most controversial aspects of the 
Brisbane Summit, with the G20 unable to claim a consensus on simply 
reporting country commitments in early 2015. Coming off the back of a 
historic agreement between China and the US, the G20’s reportedly 
heated discussions robbed climate discussions of much-needed 
momentum, which was further eroded by the painstaking negotiations on 
some more technical dimensions to a climate accord in Peru.  
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Given the history of negotiations, the G20 should be looking for 
contingencies in the event of further failure on climate change. 
Achievements on emissions standards and scaled-up climate change 
finance provide important pragmatic steps forward that can be built upon 
in the future. Further, Turkey has nominated climate finance as a core 
issue, stating that it will conduct studies to improve the collaboration, 
dialogue, and cooperation between climate funds. In addition to these 
efforts, the G20 should look for members to build on the commitments 
made to the Green Carbon Fund with further financial contributions. 
A PROSPECTIVE PUBLIC NARRATIVE 
Imagine that it is the day after the Antalya Summit, and people wake up 
to see the international media proclaiming that the G20 has well and 
truly delivered in 2015. OECD and IMF analysis claims that G20 
members have delivered on the majority of the 2 per cent target, backing 
up their forecasts from the October 2015 IMF-World Bank annual 
meetings. G20 Leaders have agreed to a firm target that will address 
persistently high youth unemployment, and outlined its ambitious 
collective plans to actually put 100 million more women into jobs by 
2025. In a broad-ranging set of achievements, the G20 is also taking real 
action to advance longer-term global governance issues. These include 
the first steps on developing new international energy architecture and a 
new international tax body, and long-awaited, tangible (albeit modest) 
progress on improving governance arrangements at the IMF. Leaders 
are also praised for reaching a consensus position on climate change 
that provides real leader-driven direction ahead of UN negotiations in 
Paris. Rounding out the achievements, leaders will also take action to 
improve the WTO’s decision-making framework and, as part of a 
renewed G20 mandate on development, finance ministers are taking 
steps to improve global health governance arrangements. 
Based on where the G20 is positioned at the end of 2014, this sort of 
public narrative is possible, although achieving outcomes on substantive, 
specific, tangible outcomes across the broad range of topics will clearly 
not be easy. It highlights that if the Turkish Presidency is to be 
considered a success, it needs to be more than just an implementer of 
existing priorities and domestic issues. It needs to focus attention on 
cross-border governance issues that the forum’s reputation depends on.  
Achievement will allow the 2015 Presidency to demonstrate that the G20 
is continuing to play a very positive ongoing role; that governments have 
the capacity and willingness to cooperate; and that non-G8 countries are 
continuing to listen and learn how to steer global affairs. In short, it will 
restore the reputation of the G20 as the premier global economic forum. 
Yet there are substantial risks to achieving this type of narrative, and the 
consequence in a world of workarounds is that alternative forums will 
continue to be sought if the G20 is not seen to be continually 
 THE G20 AT THE END OF 2014 
 
26  
 
demonstrating its relevance. It seems certain that the G20 is destined to 
walk a tightrope of relevancy in 2015. 
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A REFLECTION ON THE G20: 
FROM STRATEGIC TO 
PRAGMATIC 
YE YU1 
 
At a speech in Shanghai early this year, Professor Oran Young, the 
world-renowned expert on international institutions and global 
governance, said global economic governance was at a risky crossroad 
from ‘punctuated equilibrium’ to ‘arrested development’. Indeed, the 
world is in a transitionary period facing the systematic challenge of re-
negotiating the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in 
almost every key issue area, from trade and finance to climate and 
development. Major economies are competing in the supply of regional 
and global public goods. The transition will occur in an incremental, 
fragmented, and chaotic way, and we cannot expect a new system to be 
agreed in a short period like what happened after the Second World 
War.  
This is the world the G20 faces today and into the future. When the G20 
Leaders’ Summit was first assembled in 2008, the former British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown praised it as creating a new world order and the 
former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva declared that it 
marked a change in global politics. Now we have realised that the G20 
needs to be more patient about its strategic role and more pragmatic 
about what can be achieved. 
Based on this modest attitude, we can find the G20 has evolved 
positively in the following aspects during the last six years: 
First, rules have been renovated in areas that exhibit more consensus 
than differences. Financial regulation and tax cooperation are typical 
examples. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) said in its report to the 
Brisbane G20 Summit that financial reform is “completing the job and 
looking ahead,” including raising capital requirements of banks, ending 
the “too big to fail” phenomenon.  
Second, in those areas of stalemate, transparency has been enhanced 
and “beggar thy neighbour” behaviour has been restrained to the 
greatest possible extent. The G20 was unable to bring about a 
breakthrough for the Doha Round, but it did help control trade 
protectionism through enhanced monitoring mechanisms. Major 
economies also improved communications about their monetary and 
                                                
1 Assistant Director, Shanghai Institute for International Studies. 
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fiscal policies through the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) among 
others. At a press conference after the first G20 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting in February this year, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde 
commented that “thanks to the good cooperation” between attendees 
the widely expected hostility, disagreement, and adversarial discussions, 
particularly on the tapering effect of the Fed’s unconventional monetary 
policy did not occur.  
Third, the development issue has found its way into the G20 with a more 
integrated framework. There have long been controversies over whether 
the G20 should cover development as it could distract the G20’s 
attention. But due to the issue’s overwhelming significance, the question 
is now more about ‘how’ than ‘whether’. Since 2010, each host of the 
G20 has tried to add favourable items to the G20’s agenda, which 
caused a ‘Christmas tree’ effect. Australia established a G20 
Development Working Group Accountability Framework to relieve the 
problem. 
Fourth, the G20 is entering a period of reflection: moving from building 
frameworks to delivering details, from making commitments to ensuring 
implementation, and from expanding scale to pursuing efficiency. How to 
streamline the development agenda mentioned above is one example. 
Another was that this year’s G20 Communiqué was reduced to just three 
pages so as to keep the G20 focused and its goals clearly 
communicated. This year, for the first time, the G20 came out with a five-
year growth plan. It is laudable that Turkey declared implementation of 
past commitments as one of the priorities for the G20 in 2015.  
Last, but not the least, with the G20 as a “premier forum for international 
economic cooperation,” nation states, international organisations, 
entrepreneurs, think tanks and civil society have been incentivised to 
provide innovative ideas and solutions for our global economic issues 
with strategic implications. This catalytic role of the G20 should not be 
underestimated, especially when this could increase the intellectual 
participation of emerging economies and foster consensus. Furthermore, 
these non-state actors can also play a role in improving accountability of 
major economies. Australia has done a great job in strengthening the 
G20’s intellectual role through the outreach activities of Think20, 
Business20, and others. 
A lot needs to be done by the G20 in the future, of course. Priorities for 
2015 include:  
First, it needs to be flexible enough to respond to new situations. For 
example, a more comprehensive study on the accumulated effects of 
changes to major economies’ monetary policies, and the impact of global 
energy markets and geopolitical conflicts on the world economy; a 
renewed focus on the global financial safety net and candid discussions 
on specific cases like Russia and Argentina to prevent worsening of their 
situations.  
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Second, more assessment is needed on the appropriateness of the new 
financial regulatory standards for different countries. There are critical 
views from Chinese commentators.2 ‘Option B’ has to be detailed if IMF 
reform cannot move forward. 
Third, broader development issues, including energy and climate, need 
to be better integrated into the G20 mainstream under the Finance track. 
Only in this way can the G20 develop its comparative advantage of 
dealing with global and cross-cutting issues.  
Fourth, the intellectual role of the G20 has a lot of potential to exploit. 
Think20 needs to better reflect cutting-edge economics and bridge gaps 
between theoretical studies and policy prescriptions. This is a reliable 
way to keep the G20 strategic in the long run. 
 
                                                
2 Zou Lixing, "The Deficiencies of Basel III Put Pressure on Developing Countries," 
International Finance News, 3 November 2014. 
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THE G20 AT THE END OF 2014: 
WHERE IS IT AT? 
JUN YOKOTA1 
 
Just before the Brisbane G20 Summit, the International New York Times 
wrote that “Hopes are Low as G-20 meets.” After the event, reporting in 
the Japanese press was rather low-key and mostly factual, with only one 
major economic paper — Nihon Keizai Shinbun — commenting that 
what was noticeable about the Summit was the bickering between its 
participants on numerous issues and the need for a “rebuilding” of the 
G20 in order to achieve tangible results against the background of 
increasing economic clout of its emerging economy members. The 
article mentioned examples of the areas where differences of positions 
were apparent: infrastructure, IMF reform, and the use of fiscal 
measures to boost the economy. 
In terms of judging whether the group has delivered tangible results so 
far, one measure which can be used may be to see how the repeated 
call in the successive G20 communiqués for standstill and rollback 
commitments are being observed. In this regard, the latest WTO report 
on recent trade developments issued on 6 November 2014 paints a 
rather unflattering picture of the G20’s performance. It says that the 
stock of restrictive trade measures introduced by the G20 continues to 
rise despite the pledge, and that G20 economies applied 93 new trade-
restrictive measures during the period between mid-May and mid-
October of this year. Although one can cite as a mitigating factor that 
during the same period the same economies introduced 79 trade-
liberalising measures and that the number of restrictive measures 
affecting exports declined significantly, this result is not something that 
the G20 as a group should be proud of. 
In Brisbane, the Australian Government has done a laudable job of 
achieving world leaders’ commitment to lift the G20‘s GDP by at least an 
additional 2 per cent by 2018, through the implementation of the 
Brisbane Action Plan. What is more, the Brisbane Communiqué says: 
“We will monitor and hold each other to account for implementing our 
commitments.” Although these ‘monitoring’ and ‘accountability’ elements 
both appear in previous communiqués, this time they seem to have been 
carried a notch further in order to “ensure our growth strategies continue 
to deliver.” 
                                                
1 Senior Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs. 
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Now, an optimistically inclined person might think that strong economic 
growth being something that everybody — top leaders included — 
wants, everyone will gleefully implement all the right policies to stimulate 
growth making it easy for the G20 to claim that their action plan and the 
mechanism put in place have done the trick. 
Looking at what is happening in Japan to the so called “third arrow” of 
Abenomics involving structural reform, if the pace of implementation of 
the different reform policies is slower than some had expected, it is not 
due to the lack of will by Prime Minister Abe, but rather due to the need 
to overcome resistance from the parts of Japanese society affected by 
the reform. It goes without saying that in the process of overcoming such 
resistance, being a quintessentially domestic and political one, pressure 
from the international community, even with the best of intentions, plays 
a rather limited role. 
Since an important ingredient for the success of the Brisbane Action 
Plan is the implementation of structural reform by its members, it seems 
that the G20 is now more than ever staking its credibility on the outcome 
of a process which is hard even for a determined political leader to 
achieve in time and to the full extent. 
I do hope that, in spite of this, this time, the commitments by leaders with 
regard to economic growth will be qualitatively different from the ones on 
standstill and rollback of trade-restrictive measures so that the target of 
raising global growth might be achieved. 
Having said all this, the G20, being the only forum of its kind providing an 
opportunity for leaders of this group to meet annually to discuss matters 
of mutual concern, and, why not, to be used as an occasion to announce 
some good news like the unblocking of the Bali package, still remains a 
useful grouping. 
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GROUP WITH A CAUSE: 
THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE 
TO THE G20, BUT IT DOES 
NEED REFORM 
KATHARINA GNATH AND CLAUDIA SCHMUCKER1 
 
At the moment, there is no alternative to the G20, which remains the 
only international forum for enabling dialogue on equal terms among 
both important industrial countries and emerging market economies. But 
greatly differing interests and circumstances among members make 
compromise extremely difficult, and the summits have started to lose 
their lustre. If the G20 wants to remain an effective forum, it must be 
strengthened and should concentrate on international themes. 
In mid-November 2014, the G20 heads of state and government 
convened in Brisbane, Australia, for their annual meeting. Even though 
the summits have lost much of their lustre, there is still no alternative to 
this forum. As the global financial crisis showed all too clearly, there are 
enormous governance gaps in the international economic system that 
are still far from being closed — be it in financial regulation, redressing 
macroeconomic imbalances, or in questions of global tax competition. 
Because only the G20 enables a dialogue at eye level between highly 
industrialised states and the major emerging market economies, it 
remains the only plausible international forum for sounding out possible 
compromises on these subjects. 
Beyond matters of long-term economic and financial policy, the G20 also 
offers an important platform for its member states to respond with speed 
and flexibility to current topics and crises. As we saw most recently in 
Brisbane, the heads of state and government used the opportunity 
furnished by the G20 Summit for intensive bilateral meetings. In 
Australia, for example, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel met with 
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to discuss the situation in Ukraine in a 
talk that lasted more than three hours. 
The G20 had an impressive launch, responding swiftly to the near 
collapse of the international financial system of 2008 and 2009. Since 
then, however, enthusiasm for the forum has clearly started to wane, as 
has the overall readiness of its members to cooperate with each other. 
Large differences in economic cycles, in overall economic conditions, 
                                                
1 Dr. Katharina Gnath is an Associate Fellow at the Globalization and World Economy 
Program of the German Council of Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. Dr. Claudia 
Schmucker directs the DGAP’s Globalization and World Economy Program.  
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and in political interests make it very hard indeed to reach compromise 
on an international level.  
On top of this, the implementation of international G20 agreements 
depends on the willingness of individual member states and their 
respective political circumstances. The agreements must also be ratified 
in part by national parliaments, which can hamper implementation. One 
example is the United States’ political system, with its current political 
deadlock. The forum’s future is therefore uncertain — despite its central 
importance for global economic governance. If it is to maintain its long-
term effectiveness as a forum for dialogue and informal deal-making, the 
G20 must be strengthened. 
FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL TOPICS 
Billed as a great success of the Brisbane Summit were the more than 
800 measures undertaken by individual member states designed to 
increase global economic growth in the next five years by an additional 
2.1 per cent.2 There is no doubt that the G20 can support changes in 
national policy such as structural reforms, investments in infrastructure, 
and national action plans to promote growth. What is ultimately needed, 
however, is political will for such change, and the reform efforts have to 
come from the member states themselves; the informal G20 does not 
have enough direct influence at the national policy level. Because of this, 
the G20 should stop placing themes like growth through investment and 
structural reform at the centre of its agenda in the future and instead 
focus on topics that can only be solved at the international level and on 
which the forum can contribute direct added value.  
Topics on which the G20 could reach decisive compromises in the future 
include, among others: better international tax cooperation; the removal 
of blockades in the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Round; 
reform of international financial institutions; and further financial 
regulation (for example in the area of shadow banking). Moreover, the 
high-level meetings should above all be used to give political impetus to 
greater international coordination and better standards. Implementation 
needs to take place in cooperation with such established international 
organisations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Basel-based Financial 
Stability Board (FSB). 
                                                
2 G20 Leaders’ Communiqué, Brisbane, 16 November 2014, 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-1116-communique.html (accessed November 2014).  
 THE G20 AT THE END OF 2014 
 
34  
 
A BETTER ANCHOR FOR THE G20 “TROIKA” 
The G20 is a member-driven forum, organised by a presidency that 
changes every year. Experience has shown that each new G20 
presidency places its own items and priorities on the agenda and that 
these are often the result of national political processes and self-interest. 
This tends to overload the summit thematically — at the expense of 
coherence and continuity. 
There are frequent calls for the G20 to establish a secretariat, but it 
would be difficult to align this with the G20’s informal character.3 The 
forum’s dialogue should continue to be driven forward by its members, 
as this ensures their ownership and commitment. One option for 
strengthening thematic continuity and providing better anchorage amid 
the rotating presidencies would be to further develop the “Presidential 
Troika” made up of the previous, the current, and the future G20 
presidencies. Regular meetings and jointly established priorities could 
thus shape the agenda for three consecutive years. It also makes sense 
to pare down the G20 agenda to three long-term goals that could be 
overseen by the respective presidencies in comprehensive workstreams. 
This would strengthen thematic continuity, keep the regular agenda from 
getting bogged down, and preserve the necessary freedom and summit 
time for world leaders to approach and react with flexibility to a range of 
current subjects and crises. 
TURKEY’S 2015 G20 PRESIDENCY: MORE 
CONCENTRATION AND CONTINUITY 
The fact that systemically relevant states regularly meet at the highest 
political level provides an added value for governance of the global 
economy — even beyond the management of acute crises. It is 
therefore imperative to preserve this forum and to strengthen it. In 
November 2015, the tenth G20 summit of heads of state and 
government is to be held in Antalya under the Presidency of Turkey. 
Turkey has set three priorities for its G20 presidency in 2015: 
Inclusiveness, Implementation, and Investment for Growth.4 Within the 
framework of its presidency, Turkey has taken over many topics from 
Australia, including trade, employment, infrastructure investment, and 
energy. The precise areas of focus are still unclear, however. The 11 
sub-themes currently on the agenda should be reduced as quickly as 
possible in order to design specific and realistic goals for November 
                                                
3 See for example Jörg Asmussen’s introductory statement for the panel discussion on 
“The G20 and the Future of Global Economic Governance” at the annual meeting of the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) in Washington DC, 12 October 2013, 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp131012.en.html (accessed 
November 2014). 
4 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014.  
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2015. The focus, moreover, needs to shift away from themes of national 
growth and set a course toward substantive international topics such as 
trade and energy. 
It is high time for Australia, Turkey, and China to sit down together to 
establish the main areas of focus and set the agenda for the next few 
years. There are already close political bonds between Australia and 
Turkey based on strong historical connections (the Battle of Gallipoli of 
1915).5 China for its part, as a rapidly industrialising country, is surely 
extremely interested in making the most of its 2016 presidency and in 
shoring up the G20 as a central forum. This is, therefore, an optimal time 
to deepen and consolidate the cooperation of the troika and thereby 
ensure the long-term continuity and coherence — as well as the 
effectiveness — of the G20. 
                                                
5 ANZAC Day, Australia’s most important national holiday, commemorates the First 
World War Battle of Gallipoli, in which Australia suffered heavy losses against Turkish 
Ottoman troops. Kemal Atatürk remembered the Australian and New Zealand soldiers 
who lost their lives at Gallipoli in an important speech in 1934. This joint 
commemoration furthered close ties between Australia and Turkey. The hundredth 
anniversary of the battle will take place in 2015 (during the Turkish Presidency of the 
G20). 
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BACK ON TRACK 
FAN HE1 
 
Global economic growth has lost momentum recently, with the IMF 
revising its global growth forecast down for both 2014 and 2015 and 
warning that “growth is uneven and still weak overall and remains 
susceptible to many downside risks.”2 Emerging markets are facing an 
especially tough time. Since the global financial crisis, emerging markets 
have been the primary force for growth, but they are now suffering an 
unprecedented slowdown.  
Against this backdrop, the challenge is how to unleash the potential for 
economic growth, and at the same time to increase its resilience. Thanks 
to the Australian Presidency, the Brisbane Summit meeting has finally 
returned the G20 to a more normal track. Rather than finger pointing and 
blame shifting, now member countries are trying to work together on a 
series of policies to revitalise economic growth. 
A growth target has been announced. Member countries committed in 
Brisbane to lift the G20’s GDP by more than 2 per cent above the current 
trajectory over five years. If the goal is achieved, $US2 trillion will be 
added to the global economy, and millions of new jobs created. Much 
emphasis has been put on structural reforms in each country. The IMF 
and OECD will monitor the progress that member countries have made 
through regular reports.  
It is fair to say that the 2 per cent goal does not have any binding power. 
Each country has its own specific policy measures and there is no way 
to find a one-size-fits-all solution. However, by publicly pledging oneself 
to this benchmark, member countries can improve the credibility of 
much-needed structural reforms. Policy-makers can utilise the peer 
pressure to overcome domestic political roadblocks, if they want to do 
so. 
It is also encouraging to see that more practical policies have been put 
on the agenda. Infrastructure investment was another priority for the 
Brisbane Summit meeting. Although the demand for infrastructure 
building is huge there is a wide funding gap, with governments facing 
stricter budget constraints, and there are greater restrictions on banks’ 
long-term lending associated with new regulatory requirements. 
Innovations are needed to close this gap. The Brisbane G20 Leaders’ 
Summit asked the right questions, but was unable to provide satisfactory 
                                                
1 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
2 IMF, World Economic Outlook: Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties.  
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answers. More ideas and practices will need to emerge in the coming 
years.  
It seems that the G20 is moving forward from phase one, or G20 1.0, to 
phase two, or G20 2.0. In the immediate aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, G20 summits helped save the world from more severe economic 
crisis. The main policy measures that member countries adopted were 
fiscal and monetary stimulus packages to boost economic growth. 
However, when crisis subsided, a clash of interests emerged. The 
legitimacy of G20 is declining, and people are increasingly cynical as to 
what the forums can achieve. By insisting on economic growth as the 
priority of the agenda, the success of the Brisbane Summit meeting can 
help to boost morale. Australia has also tried hard to engage both 
developed and developing countries, and improve the habits of 
cooperation. Hopefully, the dialogues and coordination will continue. 
Turkey has been selected as the G20 Chair in 2015 and China in 2016. 
Under both presidencies we can expect a continuous and further 
deepening discussion of all these issues, and a more active involvement 
of emerging markets.  
The G20 could do better by upgrading to a phase 3.0. Economic growth 
is important, but it is not the answer to all the questions. We have to look 
beyond the fluctuation of annual growth rates and address the issue of 
global governance gaps. All long-term issues with global governance 
and multilateral organisations should be on the G20 agenda. 
The current situation is far from optimistic. The future of the multilateral 
trade system and the World Trade Organization is in trouble. Regional 
free trade agreements are as messy as a bowl of spaghetti. Many 
member countries are worried about a clash among blocs and backlash 
against globalisation. The G20 needs to restore confidence in the world 
trade system by pushing forward the Doha Round and making sure that 
any regional trade negotiations should be consistent with WTO rules. 
The IMF reforms remain stalled because of continuing deadlock in the 
United States. The longer the IMF reforms are delayed, the more 
centrifugal forces will be generated. For example, BRICS countries are 
working on the proposal of a common currency pool as well as the 
BRICS Bank, or New Development Bank. These developments are not a 
challenge to the existing regime, but rather a response to the failure to 
pass IMF reforms.  
The coming two years will be an important period in the evolution of the 
G20. In the G20’s tradition, a “troika” made up of the current, immediate 
past, and next host countries should work together on the summit 
agenda. When China takes the 2016 Presidency, the troika will consist 
of Turkey, Australia, and China. 
China is rising steadily and trying to find its place in the new alignment of 
global power. The G20 is a major platform for dialogue and coordination 
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between large developed and developing countries. China feels far more 
at ease at the G20 than in other forums like the G8. It has always been 
very supportive and is more willing to shoulder greater responsibilities in 
the international community. China needs the G20 and the G20 needs 
China. When China assumes the Presidency, it should seek to strike a 
fine balance between developed and developing countries, which will 
greatly boost the credibility of the G20. 
However, a positive reaction from the international community will also 
be important. It has to be admitted that many Chinese people still have a 
deep-rooted distrust of the West, and Chinese leaders are becoming 
more confident in asserting that China no longer has an interest in 
pleasing the international community. Domestic politics influence 
diplomacy, and the evolving economic and political changes in China 
may reflect on its international stance. A Cold War mindset and zero-
sum game approach would jeopardise, and be poisonous to, G20 
cooperation. One only has to look at how geopolitical conflicts tarnished 
the G8. A similar failure within the G20 would be unacceptable for its 
membership. Each country has its own different diplomatic traditions, but 
to foster collaborative relationships, they will need to develop habits of 
thinking collectively about the common challenges of global economic 
governance. 
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WHERE IS THE G20 AT END-
2014? 
STEPHEN GRENVILLE1 
 
The Brisbane G20 meeting sharpened the agenda-setting, shortened the 
communiqué, and maintained the focus on economic growth. But many 
still feel that G20 is a group in search of more substance. No one doubts 
the importance of leaders getting together (Gareth Evans makes a good 
statement of the case), but there are other meetings where G20 leaders 
can maintain their personal contacts.2 If the G20 meeting is 
characterised as lacking substance, it is only a matter of time before one 
or more of the key attendees will find some pressing engagement 
elsewhere, putting the G20’s primacy in jeopardy. Thus more needs to 
be done to create some substantive ongoing core responsibilities for the 
G20. 
Reflecting the complexity of global interaction is the plethora of 
specialised international agencies, typically operating without direct input 
from leaders. One possibility would be for the G20 to develop over time 
its role as a ginger group and steering committee for some of these more 
specialised international agencies. Whenever this is suggested 
(sometimes under the rubric of ‘One G to rule them all’) there is 
understandable pushback from two quarters: from these international 
agencies themselves, and from smaller countries not directly 
represented at the G20.  
These agencies see such a move as encroaching on their independence 
and freedom. That is understandable but not a reason for holding back. 
Where agencies have been tardy or ineffective in promoting global 
causes, a push from leaders may be helpful. Even where these agencies 
are performing competently, their outlook can be narrow, with groupthink 
always a danger. Feedback and guidance from the highest leadership 
level can broaden perspectives and set priorities across the wider policy 
spectrum. 
As well, there is resistance from those countries not included in the G20. 
This may, however, reflect a misunderstanding of how this proposal 
could be put into practice. These countries are often directly represented 
in these other bodies (such as the UN, the WTO, or the IMF) and may 
consider that encouraging the G20 to exert pressure on these bodies 
                                                
1 Non-resident Fellow, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2Gareth Evans, “Why Summits Matter,” Project Syndicate, 24 November 2014, 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/apec-g-20-and-east-asian-summits-by-
gareth-evans-2014-11. 
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dilutes or deprives them of their own governance role. The reality, 
however, is that universal representation provides an ineffectual voice for 
most members. Reflecting the inevitable conflict between universal 
representation and effectiveness, de facto control shifts to a smaller 
group of larger countries, such as the Security Council in the UN or the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) at the IMF. 
Where this de facto centralised decision-making process is avoided by 
giving all members a veto power through a requirement for unanimity (as 
with the WTO), the decision process is interminable. 
The reality is that broad oversight by the G20 leaders would provide a 
wider representation than the existing governance arrangements. At 
present the decisions reflect consensus agreement by G2, G7, or long-
standing regional coalitions, notably the European Union, where the 
opportunities for prior self-interested consensus-building are numerous. 
This can be illustrated in the case of the International Monetary Fund. All 
188 member countries can attend the annual Board meeting, but for 
most of them the occasion is representational rather than governance. 
The high-level governance action is with the IMFC. The daily operational 
issues (often the most important) are in the hands of the Executive 
Board. Both the IMFC and the Executive Board are limited to 24 
members, and while all 188 members are included through constituency 
representation, the G7 countries still call the shots. It is unsurprising that 
neither of these two in-house groups has been able to achieve 
governance reform, particularly to give adequate representation to the 
fast-growing emerging economies, which are underrepresented in 
current IMF quotas and voting rights. It was the 2010 G20 meeting in 
Seoul that moved this issue forward. The G20 is in the best position to 
bring pressure to bear on the US to implement the Seoul agreement and 
carry this issue forward in the future. 
The key to building the G20’s role in this way lies with restrained 
exercise of leadership, recognising what can and can’t be done. The 
G20 must leave the day-to-day governance of these other bodies to their 
own (often long-standing and legally-based) arrangements. Its influence 
comes from the opportunity to develop consensus and refine opinion at 
the highest level. Even a partial consensus at the G20 can often provide 
a solid voting majority when the issue comes to be settled in the 
specialised agency. Specialist agencies and their permanent 
bureaucracies tend to work at the margin in evolving policy and 
procedures. Leaders can, from time to time, provide the disruptive shift 
of mindset that can move stalled or ossified issues forward. 
With a more active role like this, the task of the revolving chair would 
evolve in a useful way. There would be fewer opportunities for distracting 
new agenda-widening issues (every chair feels the need to leave their 
mark on the G20) and more on-going continuity. 
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THE G20 AT THE END OF 2014: 
WHERE IS IT AT? 
CARLOS HEREDIA1 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions, created in 1944, established the rules for 
commercial and financial relations among the world's major industrial 
states. Back then, one country, the United States of America, 
concentrated half of the world’s output and together with the Soviet 
Union represented the two poles of the military balance that prevailed 
throughout the Cold War.  
Seven decades after, in 2014, the world lacks a system of global 
governance. The political integration of transnational actors aimed at 
negotiating responses to problems that affect more than one state or 
region has two key institutions: the UN system that deals with global 
issues but is often undermined by the global powers that be, and the 
Group of Seven (G7), which caters to the interests of the West but 
dictates policy for the rest.  
Countries coalesce by affinity of interests. The G7 (United States, Japan, 
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada), with 11 per cent 
of the world’s population commands 49.5 per cent of global GDP and 
has an average per capita income of $US47 500. In a sharp contrast, the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), with 41 per cent 
of the total population, only represent 22.3 per cent of the world’s output, 
with an average per capita income of $US5300. There is obviously an 
ongoing shift of power and wealth from the North to the South and from 
the West to the East; the approach to global issues of these two blocks 
is often at odds, to say the least.  
The rest of the world, which accounts for the remaining 28 per cent of 
the world’s output, tries to carve its own niche in the international 
system. The G20 can be seen as a maxi-G7, or a mini-UN General 
Assembly. The ongoing debate on the reform of the Security Council 
underlines the tension between the will of non-Western countries to bear 
greater weight on the decision-making processes in international affairs 
(power sharing), versus their reluctance to take on more commitments, 
pay higher fees, and assume greater responsibilities in the global 
institutions (burden sharing).  
                                                
1 Research Professor at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), 
and Founding Associate, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI), Mexico 
City. 
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The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities has become a 
focal point of current negotiations on climate change and the post-2015 
agenda. While the developing countries want to preserve the principle, 
the industrialised countries argue that global power structures have 
changed, and that fair burden sharing must include contributions from 
emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil to address climate 
protection and other global challenges. 
The November 15-16 G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia, took place in 
the midst of a series of challenges that seem unmanageable: Ebola, 
Syria, Ukraine, ISIS, major powers jockeying for power in the South 
China Sea, and insufficient collective climate action in light of the 
financialisation of nature, which all bring greater uncertainty to the world 
economy. These challenges of course bring fresh questions as to what 
the identity and the role of the G20 should be. The Turkish Presidency, 
on the road to the November 2015 G20 Summit in Antalya, believes that 
G20 countries, accounting for three-quarters of world trade, have the 
potential to boost global trade growth to pre-crisis levels, provided that 
an open, predictable, non-discriminatory, and rule-based multilateral 
trading system is upheld. 
MEXICO AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE G20: WHERE DO WE GO 
FROM HERE? 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico do not work together, nor do they consult 
among themselves on their decisions at the G20. Furthermore, Brazil 
and Cuba — whose presence in the region is bound to increase in the 
aftermath of the December 17th announcement by Washington and 
Havana that they are resuming diplomatic relations — are the only two 
Latin American countries that have a presence and a geopolitical 
agenda in every continent.  
Mexico is a middle power that has little or no clout outside North 
America. The inception of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, 
and Australia — all G20 countries) responds more to the desire of these 
middle powers to carve their own niche in the international system than 
to an agreed upon, clear-cut, common agenda.  
A big paradox is that Mexico is the country with the worst average 
annual per capita growth figure (0.9 per cent) in Latin America between 
1994 and 2013, in spite of the fact that it has implemented the orthodox 
neoliberal disciplines embedded in the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). The promise of President Enrique Peña Nieto’s 11 
structural reforms passed by the Mexican Congress in 2012-2014 has 
been overshadowed by the unrelenting violence derived from the failed 
‘war on drugs’ and by a lethal combination of political corruption and 
impunity.  
The main challenge to global governance is how to manage this power 
share, in order to balance national interests with global interests, as well 
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as the aspirations of the masses with the privileges of the few. In the 
years preceding the First World War, there was simultaneously a boost 
of world trade and an increase in the polarisation between rich and poor. 
One hundred years later, austerity measures imposed by governments 
have resulted in job losses, instability, and social protests, while the 
privileges of the economic and political elites remain untouched. 
Political pluralism plus a market economy were supposed to strengthen 
the international system; however, more often than not, they have 
resulted in plutocracies. What exactly will be the value added to the G20 
by the countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America? Will 
their elites be content with the continuity of the ‘order’ of the Westphalian 
system, or will they push for change to bring about global economic and 
social justice? Judging from their performance, they seem to favour the 
former over the latter. This does not bode well for the G20 to become an 
effective tool for systemic stability and global governance. 
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G20 AT THE CROSSROADS: 
THE GOVERNMENT THE 
WORLD NEEDS 
SERGEY DROBYSHEVSKY1 
 
The Australian G20 Presidency in 2014 got its success. Over the last 
year, G20 countries have made a firm step towards mutually agreed 
approaches to stimulate economic growth, and took responsibility for 
facilitating higher aggregate GDP growth (of an additional 2 per cent 
over five years). It was very important that all members agreed to regular 
peer review of their national growth strategies. This outcome clearly 
testifies to the fact that the G20 is going to become a real global 
‘economic government’ concerned with dealing with pressing global 
economic challenges, tied together through a coherent narrative. Other 
international organisations such as the OECD, the WTO, the ILO, the 
FSB, the BIS, the IMF, and the World Bank will then perform roles as 
specific targeted ‘ministries’ working on G20 priorities. Such a practice 
advocates for a growing influence of the G20 in the world, and marks a 
success of the format during the current turbulent time and when the 
world is still far from a position of re-establishing sustainable economic 
growth. 
Geopolitical factors have played an important role in recent leaders' 
summits, with the situation in Syria a prominent discussion point during 
the Saint Petersburg Summit and the situation in Ukraine a prominent 
discussion point in Brisbane. From the Russian perspective, where the 
geopolitical situation remains uneasy, I'd like to warn of the risks in the 
G20 drifting from its role as the ‘economic government’ to one more of 
an international institution dealing with international affairs or global 
security issues. As an economist (and not a diplomat or a specialist in 
international relations) my view is that there are many international 
institutions in the international affairs and global security field, including 
the UN, the G7, the League of Arab States, and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, among others. The record of these 
institutions over the last 20 years suggests a rather low level of overall 
effectiveness. In addition, BRICS countries’ tendency to move as a bloc 
is partly in response to the politicisation of the G20.  
The G20 should remain the main economic club in the world, and not 
risk the effectiveness of international cooperation by focusing too widely. 
                                                
1 Director of Russia's G20 Expert Council, Academic Director of the Gaidar Institute for 
Economic Policy. 
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In my opinion, the G20 currently has power and influence over both the 
global economy and national economies, which is very important right 
now. The global economy has not yet overcome the consequences of 
the 2008-2009 economic crisis, the ‘ghost’ of secular stagnation is 
walking and as such we cannot afford to lose the G20’s well-functioning 
format for elaborating coordinated economic policy for all countries, 
whether developed or developing. 
It is also important to recognise the value of requiring a consensus in 
G20 decision-making. This rule gives an opportunity to all member 
countries to be equal, to use all advantages of the G20 format and to 
incorporate national interests in final decisions. This arrangement is 
unique and distinguishes the G20 from other cornerstone international 
organisations such as the IMF, where current member countries’ quotas 
do not represent their weights in the global economy; or the UN Security 
Council, where only some countries have a veto. 
I consider it a lucky circumstance that Turkey has taken the Presidency 
during such a challenging period for the world and the G20. Turkey takes 
an independent position in major geopolitical conflicts and keeps its 
distance from the confrontation between Russia and the West. The 
proposed G20 Agenda for 2015 seems to be a logical consequence of 
ongoing initiatives and is aimed at development of some new vectors in 
G20 activity, but does not stray into geopolitical measures. As I have 
outlined, I sincerely hope that the economy remains the G20’s main 
focus in 2015, without any drift into geopolitics. It would be a substantial 
success if the Turkish Presidency were able to maintain such an 
approach throughout 2015. In 2016, China will chair the G20, and it will 
become much more difficult to maintain a safe distance from the 
geopolitical agenda then. 
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HOW AUSTRALIANS WILL 
REMEMBER THE BRISBANE 
G20 SUMMIT 
MELISSA CONLEY TYLER AND DUC DAO1 
 
Public perception is a key element of the success of an international 
summit. The Brisbane G20 in November 2014 will be judged not just by 
its impact on the global economy, but also by how Australian public 
opinion remembers it. 
Building on the excellent work of the CIGI National Perspectives on 
Global Leadership series by Colin Bradford, which views the G20 as a 
national conversation between leaders and their publics, we have 
surveyed media coverage of the Brisbane Summit to produce a 
snapshot of how Australia’s G20 Presidency was understood and thus 
how it is likely to be remembered by the public.2 We drew on the 
headlines of the major Australian news outlets including The Sydney 
Morning Herald, The Age, The Australian, The Courier Mail, The 
Australian Financial Review, Brisbane Times, and the ABC in the three 
weeks prior to and during the week following the Summit. From viewing 
this coverage, four weak and two stronger themes emerged: 
• The G20 as a waste of money 
• The G20 as an opportunity to gain the spotlight for a cause 
• The G20 as a way for Australia to assume its place on the global 
stage 
• The G20 as an embarrassment for Australia on climate change 
• The G20 as a vehicle for signature initiatives  
• The G20’s contribution to global economic governance 
We will look at these in turn. 
                                                
1 Australian Institute of International Affairs. 
2 “National Perspectives on Global Leadership,” Center for International Governance 
Innovation, accessed December 2014, https://www.cigionline.org/project/national-
perspectives-global-leadership. 
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TABLE AT CENTRE OF ROW OVER MOUNTING 
EXPENSES FOR G20 TALKFEST 
It was no surprise in a domestic climate of budget worries that Australia's 
hosting of the G20 drew some coverage regarding spending. Thankfully, 
this was very limited with only a few articles including a curious 
discussion on the cost of the conference table.3 It is an example of the 
sort of thinking that exists in most countries, but, in this case, at no point 
did it appear to predominate. Compared to a major sporting event, for 
example, there were no significant recriminations over the cost 
involved.4 This suggests that the Brisbane G20 will not be remembered 
for profligacy. 
G20 ORGANISERS AWARE OF 21 PLANNED 
PROTESTS 
In the tradition of major international summits, the Brisbane G20 became 
an occasion for advocacy groups to use the international spotlight to 
make their presence known.5 Although there were some anti-
globalisation groups, the vast majority of protestors were not challenging 
capitalism but aiming to bring attention to a specific issue, including 
indigenous rights, Tibet, Australia’s treatment of refugees, veganism, 
legalisation of marijuana, and South Korea’s ferry tragedy.6 
These demonstrations attracted substantial coverage with many 
headlines before the event expressing worries about order and safety. 
Despite these fears the G20 turned out to be mostly peaceful and 
coverage of protests suggested more of a carnival atmosphere. 
Protestors were effective in directing media attention to their causes but 
                                                
3 Heath Aston, “Table at Centre of Row over Mounting Expenses for G20 Gabfest,” The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 22 October 2014.  
4 There were very few discussions of this type after the Summit with most of them 
concluding that hosting such important international events would benefit Australia 
overall, for example Larry Graham, “Are International Gabfests like CHOGM and G20 
Worth the Cost,” The Age, 24 November 2014.  
5 Cameron Atfield, “G20 Organisers Aware of 21 Planned Protests,” The Age, 15 
October 2014.  
6 Louisa Rebgetz, “G20: Indigenous Protesters Rally in Brisbane CBD ahead of 
Leaders’ Summit,” ABC News, 10 November 2014; Melissa Conley Tyler, “Gender 
Equality is Key,” G20 Watch (blog), 17 November 2014, http://g20watch.edu.au/gender-
equality-key. 
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this is unlikely to be recalled as the defining episode of the Summit.7 
This is very different from some of the protests of the past.8 
TONY ABBOTT PROMISES TO SHIRTFRONT PUTIN AT 
G20 SUMMIT 
Dominating the headlines in the lead-up to the Brisbane Summit was 
Tony Abbott's threat to ‘shirtfront’ Vladimir Putin over Russia's handling 
of the MH17 incident.9 The Prime Minister's creative use of a term 
traditionally associated with an aggressive Australian football manoeuvre 
was a cause of much bemusement.10 The tension, however, eventually 
fizzled out with the two leaders amicably cuddling koalas together on the 
side of the Summit.11  
Apart from adding a new word to the diplomatic lexicon, media coverage 
focused on whether it was appropriate that the PM took advantage of the 
G20 to vent his domestic concerns, most notably when he complained to 
world leaders about his difficulties passing a tax on visits to the doctor.12 
So, while the suspense around the Putin-Abbott confrontation put 
Australia's place in the group at the centre of attention, it is unlikely that 
Australians will remember the Brisbane G20 as a coming of age for 
Australia on the diplomatic stage.13 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN G20 COMMUNIQUÉ AFTER 
TRENCH WARFARE 
An aspect reported as a misstep was Australia's stance on climate 
change.14 Before the Summit, Prime Minister Abbott insisted on driving 
the agenda towards economic growth rather than environmental 
                                                
7 Coverage of this issue after the Summit was mostly focused on the success of the 
organisers in policing the event, such as Cameron Atfield and Kim Stephens, “G20 
Brisbane: Passionate, but Mostly Peaceful Protests,” The Age, 15 November 2014, and 
Cameron Atfield, “G20 Success Measured by the Lack of Numbers,” The Age, 17 
November 2014. 
8 Roselina Press, “G20s of the Past: Protests in Pictures,” G20 Watch (blog), 31 
October 2014, http://g20watch.edu.au/g20s-past-protests-pictures. 
9 Sabra Lane, “Tony Abbott Promises to ‘Shirtfront’ Putin at G20 Summit,” 7.30, ABC, 13 
October 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-13/tony-abbott-promises-to-
shirtfront-putin-at-g20/5810792. 
10 Brendon Trembath, “’Shirtfront’ Named Australia’s Word of the Year by National 
Dictionary Centre,” AM, ABC, 10 December 2014. 
11 Andrew Taylor and G20 Australia, “Tony Abbott and Vladimir Putin Cuddle Koalas at 
GOMA,” ABC News, 16 November 2014. 
12 Latika Bourke, “G20 summit: Tony Abbott Laments to World Leaders His Failure to 
Pass Tax on GP Visits,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November 2014. 
13 The Courier-Mail, “G20 summit: Tony Abbott laments to world leaders his failure to 
pass tax on GP visits,” The Courier-Mail, 20 November 2014.  
14 Tom Allard, “Climate Change in G20 Communique after 'Trench Warfare',” The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 2014. 
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sustainability.15 This proved embarrassing when climate change 
ultimately made it to the final communiqué due to pressure from the 
majority of G20 members, with Australia and Saudi Arabia the only two 
members reported to be opposed to putting climate on the Summit 
agenda.  
For many Australians, a key memory will be Australia being shown as 
out of step with world opinion on climate issues. 
JOE HOCKEY TAKES TAX CRACKDOWN ON GLOBAL 
GIANTS ON G20 
For the interested public there was coverage of signature G20 initiatives. 
One that received substantial coverage in the lead-up to the Summit was 
cooperation against transnational tax avoidance schemes.16 There was 
also much positive media coverage following the Summit's greater 
attention to women’s empowerment worldwide and Sydney's host of a 
new global infrastructure hub.17 That some initiatives cut through into 
public consciousness suggests that the G20 Summit will not be 
remembered purely as a talkfest, as can easily happen given inflated 
public expectations of international meetings. 
G20 AN IMPORTANT FORUM FOR SERIOUS 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
The most serious coverage recognised that, in the end, the G20 is still 
about the economy. Observers were anxious to see if the G20 could live 
up to its promise of being an important forum for global economic 
governance.18 It was thus an optimistic sign that the majority of reactions 
were positive about what the Brisbane Summit had achieved 
commending G20 leaders for producing important declarations on major 
global issues.19 
What then can we conclude about how Australians will remember the 
Brisbane G20 Summit? For one, the widespread media coverage is 
testament to the continuous conversation between the Australian public 
                                                
15 James Massola, Nick O'Malley, Philip Wen, "Tony Abbott Says Jobs and Growth, Not 
Climate, Top of the G20 Agenda," The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 November 2014. 
16 David Crowe, "Joe Hockey Takes Tax Crackdown on Global Giants to G20," The 
Australian, 10 October 2013; Rosie Lewis, "G20 to Launch 'Aggressive' Attack on Tax 
Avoidance among Multinationals," The Australian, 14 November 2014. 
17 David Crowe and David Uren, "G20 to Target the Gender Gap," The Australian, 3 
November 2014; and Greg Earl, "Infrastructure Hub Draws G20 Together," The 
Australian Financial Review, 12 November 2014.  
18 Tom Allard, "G20 a Chance to Boost Global Economic Health," The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 15 November 2014. 
19 Mark Kenny, "G20 United on Tax Loopholes, Trade, Global Warming, Banks and 
Ebola," The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 2014. 
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and its leaders on an event of consequence to the country's international 
image. As always occurs, Australia's Presidency of the Summit was 
utilised to a certain extent as an arena for domestic political struggle. 
However, Australia's chance for international leadership was a focus of 
coverage its own right. Australians may well have been left with the 
impression that the G20 has taken another step as the premier forum for 
global economic governance and that Australia, despite a few missteps, 
has made a key contribution to this end. If so, those involved should not 
be too unhappy with how the Brisbane Summit is remembered. 
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STRONGER OUTREACH BUT 
G20 NARRATIVE STILL NOT 
RESONATING WITH 
CITIZENRY 
DR SUSAN HARRIS RIMMER1 
 
The G20 ‘outreach strategy’ refers to the diplomatic meetings and 
communications strategies used by the host state to let the rest of the 
international community know the priorities of the G20 summits, to 
consult with non-member states, regional and international 
organisations, and their own citizens on their priorities, and take on 
board their suggestions and reactions. The strategy should aim to 
address the tension between effective crisis management by a small 
number of key G20 members and the long-term objective to be a 
legitimate global actor whose decisions are supported by non-members 
and citizens. As former G20 Chair Gordon Brown said: “we will not pass 
by on the other side.”2 
In a dedicated Lowy Institute G20 Monitor in January 2014, a group of 
expert contributors considered how to improve the G20’s overall 
communication and transparency, and made the following key findings:3  
• The G20’s work has myriad implications for non-member countries. 
The G20 process needs to reflect this in a meaningful way 
• The first step for the G20 in assuming its broader, global 
responsibility is to push ahead with its efforts to promote growth in the 
G20 economies, since other countries will also significantly benefit 
from a stronger, more sustainable, and more balanced recovery in 
the world’s biggest economies 
• The G20 can do a lot to address non-member countries’ concerns 
without losing its focus and core agenda. Promoting reform in 
international organisations and facilitating productive cooperation with 
non-members and invited guests are two key areas 
                                                
1Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University. 
2 Robin Davies, "A View to Antalya: Can the G20's Development Agenda Be Saved?," 
DevPolicy (blog), 15 December 2014, http://devpolicy.org/a-view-to-antalya-can-the-
g20s-development-agenda-be-salvaged-20141215/. 
3 G20 Outreach and Non-G20 Member Views on the G20, G20 Monitor No. 7, (Sydney: 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014). 
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• Now that the G20 is approaching its sixteenth anniversary, the 
effectiveness of its outreach process warrants a constructive and 
outcome-oriented debate. Outreach is of critical importance to the 
G20’s long-term success. In addition to enhancing its outreach 
efforts, the G20’s accountability and outcome focus need to be 
strengthened in order to manifest its position as the world’s ”premier 
forum for international cooperation” 
As the troika transitions from Russia-Australia-Turkey to Australia-
Turkey-China, it is time to assess the success of the Australian 
Presidency in outreach terms and consider the prospects for Turkey and 
China.  
INVITEES 
The ability of invitees to participate fully in the year-long meetings 
schedule has still not been fully addressed.4 Australia invited Singapore, 
New Zealand, Spain, Myanmar as ASEAN Chair, Senegal as chair of 
NEPAD, and Mauritania as President of the African Union. Turkey has 
invited Singapore and Azerbaijan, as well as Spain (the permanent 
guest), NEPAD, the AU, and Malaysia will represent ASEAN. This is a 
high-water mark for ASEAN participation.  
Singapore as chair of the Global Governance Group (3G) participates 
actively and brings a representative role to its fifth G20 outing, but it is 
not always clear whether countries are able to fully participate on the 
basis of a one-off invitation. 
TRANSPARENCY 
The www.G20.org website was generally kept up-to-date in 2014 with 
lots of resources for interested parties. However, there is still not a clear 
list of sherpas or other officials, or any record of what happened at 
meetings not followed by a Ministerial Declaration. Twitter became an 
important outreach tool during the Australian Presidency (with 1.02 
million tweets about the Brisbane Summit), and this is likely to continue.5  
                                                
4 Susan Harris Rimmer, “Explainer: Who Gets Invited to the G20 Summit and Why,” The 
Conversation, 3 November 2014.  
5 Peta Mitchell, Axel Bruns, Darryl Woodford, and Katie Prowd, "From Selfies to Climate 
Change: The #G20 Debate on Twitter," The Conversation, 20 November 2014. 
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Source: QUT Social Media Research Group. 
ENGAGEMENT GROUPS 
The Australian Sherpa and Ministers have worked with each of the 
engagement partners, the L20, C20, T20, Y20, G(irls)20, and B20. It is 
clear the B20 has been most influential in its policy recommendations, 
assisted by Boston Consulting. However, outside of the ‘Ban Putin’ 
debate and interest in possible protests, awareness of the G20 by the 
general community in Australia remained low.6 Turkey has pledged that 
it “aims to ensure that discussions within the G20 resonate with the 
majority of our citizens.”7 
OFFICIAL OUTREACH ACTIVITIES AND NARRATIVE 
Outreach to other countries has been far more transparent and 
systematic than is apparent from practice in years past, with Australia 
                                                
6 Susan Harris Rimmer, "A G20 for the People? Not Yet," Devpolicy (blog), 16 
December 2014, http://devpolicy.org/a-g20-for-the-people-not-yet-20141216/. 
7 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014. 
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trying to reach as many groupings as possible, reminiscent of the 
campaign for Australia to be elected to the UN Security Council. In his 
travels and outreach efforts, Daniel Sloper, the Special Representative 
for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade even 
introduced a hint of whimsy by posting Lego versions of his 
presentations.  
  
Source: Photos posted on twitter by Daniel Sloper, https://twitter.com/G20SR 
Turkey already has a clear narrative about ‘robust’ growth. The 
challenges facing the LIDCs will be raised more vocally by the G20 as 
”one of the defining aspects of the Turkish Presidency.” There are many 
challenges on this front as Robin Davies has posited.8 
China does not allow certain social media platforms, and so will face 
challenges communicating its G20 messages internationally, but may 
reach its own citizens through Sino-Weibo. The world will be watching 
carefully as China takes centre stage in this fashion for the first time. 
My advice to the Turkish and Chinese presidencies would be simple: try 
not to let military and security issues, both domestic and international, 
overwhelm the Summit, as some progress must be shown on the core 
agenda. In previous summits, ’hot’ security topics have swept other 
issues off the table, and so releasing the Ebola communiqué was 
probably a good strategy.  
The challenges likely to be inherited by Turkey and its new Sherpa are 
immense. This may be the first time since the Second World War that a 
majority Muslim country has held the reins of global economic 
governance. Turkey is not in the BRICS or G8, so, as with Australia, it 
will need to forge alliances in the region and beyond, and use the MIKTA 
grouping for support. Like Australia, the opportunity of hosting the G20 
needs to be weighed by a disciplined approach in order to see what can 
realistically be achieved 
                                                
8 Davies, “A View to Antalya.” 
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One fascinating question is whether the G20’s Muslim member nations 
(Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Indonesia) feel a responsibility to advocate 
Islamic conceptions of finance and banking or sharia economics within 
the G20; and whether, and how, these nations provide outreach about 
their G20 discussions to other Islamic states or MENA countries. 
Turkey’s hosting of the 2015 G20 Leaders’ Summit provides a timely 
opportunity for an open enquiry on Islamic nations’ role in global 
economic governance.
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PRIORITIES FOR THE G20 IN 
2015 
STEPHEN PICKFORD1  
 
The Brisbane Summit took place against the background of a 
deteriorating outlook for the global economy, with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) warning that the global recovery was “uneven and 
brittle.” 
At the same time confidence in the G20 as an effective body to tackle 
the most pressing global economic concerns is ebbing. Despite strong 
efforts by Australia to focus the agenda and get agreement on a few key 
concrete actions, the G20’s members have some fundamental 
differences of view about the underlying problems, and find it difficult to 
prioritise the forum’s efforts. It is becoming less effective as a forum for 
economic cooperation. 
The 2014 Brisbane Summit made tangible progress in some areas: the 
agreement by G20 countries to take action to boost global growth by 2 
per cent; new structures to support infrastructure investment; and a 
commitment to make further progress in dealing with international tax 
abuses are all welcome. But the final communiqué covered a much 
wider range of issues, in most cases without agreement on concrete 
outcomes. 
Given the economic risks still facing the global economy, the 2015 
Summit is likely to face even greater challenges than in 2014. To rise 
effectively to these challenges, the G20 needs to focus firmly on the key 
priorities, and to design and agree to concrete and measurable 
responses. 
Turkey, as the Presidency country, is already inheriting a substantial 
agenda from Brisbane. In addition to ensuring that countries deliver on 
their growth commitments (through a stronger Mutual Assessment 
Process — MAP), the Brisbane communiqué promised specific actions 
in 2015 including: 
• Completing the financial regulation reform agenda 
• A report by labour and employment ministers on youth 
unemployment, labour markets, social protection, and workplace 
safety and health 
• Supporting the United Nations (UN) post-2015 Development Agenda 
                                                
1 Chatham House. 
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• Finalising work on international tax rules and the Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan 
• Developing further options for IMF quota and governance reforms, in 
the event of failure by the US Congress to ratify the 2010 reforms 
• A report by energy ministers on further energy collaboration 
• Working together for a successful outcome on climate change at the 
UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) 
Turkey has also set out a further list of issues that it also wants to focus 
on during 2015, including development, inclusion of developing 
countries, and small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Unless the 
Presidency focuses on a few key issues, there is a strong risk that little 
will be achieved. And it needs strong support for its priorities from the 
other troika members, Australia and China. 
Given the overriding need to strengthen global growth and guard against 
risks, we propose four categories of priorities for 2015: 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Trade is a major driver of global growth, but the growing list of bilateral 
and regional trade agreements is risking sidelining the multilateral 
system, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as its centre. A priority 
for the G20 should be to ensure that the WTO reforms itself to adapt to 
the new world of global value chains, integrated global standards, and 
transnational investment flows. 
INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT  
Major steps have been taken this year to put in place processes and 
institutions to support infrastructure investment. But these need to be 
translated into projects on the ground.  
As well as ensuring that countries’ pledges are put into action, the G20 
should use the political momentum behind investment to ensure that 
these projects are job-rich, and emphasise the employment potential 
when selecting projects.  
SMEs have a big role to play in creating jobs in all countries, and the 
G20 should ensure that its set of ‘leading practices’ prioritise 
opportunities for SMEs to participate in investment projects and global 
value chains; and ensure that development banks, including the World 
Bank Global Infrastructure Facility, emphasise the role of SMEs. 
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STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM  
Given the risks facing the global economy, a priority also is to strengthen 
the international financial system and its support for countries in crisis. 
There are a number of elements of unfinished business that need to be 
addressed: 
First, reforms to the basis for quotas and representation at the IMF. If the 
US is unwilling or unable to ratify the outstanding reforms agreed, the 
G20 should put its weight behind changes to the Articles of Agreement 
to remove the ability of one country to stand in the way of quota 
changes. 
Second, to build up financial safety nets for countries in difficulties, 
including a permanent network of swap arrangements between G20 
central banks; strengthening the links between the IMF and regional 
financing arrangements, such as the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM); and 
allowing the IMF to borrow from the markets to boost its resources. 
Third, to put in place a permanent international system for restructuring 
sovereign debts of countries in crisis. The case of Argentina 
demonstrates that the current system is not fit for purpose. Collective 
action clauses are a useful step forward, but they are not sufficient. 
ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE  
There is a changed dynamic to the willingness of major countries to take 
action on climate change, with the US, China, and Australia signalling 
their willingness to act. The Climate Funds are a useful step forward, but 
a new legally-binding protocol is needed to underpin further international 
action on climate change. Finding a way to bridge the differences that 
remain between G20 countries would be a major step towards a 
comprehensive UN agreement at the COP21 meeting in Paris next year. 
Reaching agreements on concrete action in these priority areas will be 
extremely challenging. Extending the agenda to cover other areas would 
risk spreading the energy and political capital within the G20 too thinly, 
so that far less is actually achieved. 
The G20 also needs to develop more inclusive processes to build wider 
support and legitimacy. There are currently ad hoc arrangements in 
some areas to involve a broader range of countries beyond the 20, and 
to involve groups in society (such as business, labour, youth, civil 
society, and think tanks) in G20 deliberations. But structures should be 
formalised to ensure that a comprehensive range of interests — 
including social partners, youth, and women — can feed directly into the 
G20 process, and that a broader range of countries are involved. 
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Strengthening these processes would increase the legitimacy of the G20 
and increase its effectiveness. 
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ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES 
THAT COULD FACILITATE THE 
SUCCESSFUL PROMOTION OF 
THE THREE I’S OF THE 
TURKISH PRESIDENCY 
FARIBORZ MOSHIRIAN1 
 
The Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu recently announced the 
focus of Turkey's agenda for its 2015 G20 Presidency. It has been 
labelled the “three I’s of the Turkish Presidency.”2 In 2015, Turkey will be 
stressing the three broad topics of inclusiveness, implementation and 
investment. Prime Minister Davutolgu, in his closing address to the 2014 
G20 Pre-Summit conference, indicated that the Turkish Presidency 
would be a symbolic deviation from the “narrow agenda focused on 
economic fundamentals” of the Australian 2014 presidency.3  
INCLUSIVENESS 
Prime Minister Davutoglu stated in a Brisbane conference that: “During 
our presidency we want to be the voice of everybody.”4 It is clear that the 
Turkish Presidency is deeply concerned with the ways in which the G20 
may comprehensively embody, voice, and act upon, the concerns of all 
participants.  
The notion of inclusiveness is said to operate on two levels; domestically 
and globally. Among Turkey's focuses is the need to ensure that all parts 
of society are able to access the benefits of growth, on a domestic level. 
In order to achieve this, Turkey will address issues of gender equality, 
particularly in relation to employment, and stress issues relating to small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and youth unemployment. On an 
international level, Turkey's Presidency intends to enhance the voice of 
low-income, developing countries in the G20, and has gone so far as to 
                                                
1 Institute of Global Finance, UNSW Business School, University of New South Wales, 
Sydney, Australia. The author wishes to thank Sarah Webster for her excellent research 
for this paper. 
2 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014. 
3 Tristram Sainsbury, "Turkey Sets Its G20 Agenda for 2015,"The Interpreter (blog), 14 
November 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/11/14/Turkey-sets-its-G20-
agenda-for-2015.aspx. 
4 Jane Wardell, "Incoming G20 Leader Turkey Says Group Must Be More Inclusive," 
Reuters, 13 November 2014. 
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say: “This will be one of the defining aspects of the Turkish Presidency.” 
The Prime Minister of Turkey has highlighted the link between 
inclusiveness and growth, indicating that enhancing the representation of 
low-income countries is necessary to achieve inclusive, balanced, and 
sustainable growth globally.5  
Another way in which the topic of inclusiveness may be interpreted 
pertains to the need to ensure that most citizens of the involved 
countries are able understand and obtain meaning from the G20 
discussions. Turkey's Presidency has articulated this as a goal to 
“ensure that discussions within the G20 resonate with the majority of our 
citizens.”6  
Indeed, one of the current challenges with the G20 is that there is no 
strategy of an inclusive approach to economic growth, particularly when 
the gap between the rich and poor is widening, both between the 
developed and developing countries, and within countries. The current 
G20 policy framework of “Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth” 
could be complemented by the idea of inclusive, strong, sustainable, and 
balanced growth. While balanced growth was included earlier in the G20 
Communiqué, which referred to the gap in economic growth between 
China and the US or the EU and some other G20 members, inclusive 
growth will ensure a more meaningful outcome of economic growth for 
global economic prosperity.  
At the same time, a large proportion of the world’s population is not 
included in the member countries forming the G20 and so raising the 
awareness of people to achieve a truly inclusive approach could inspire 
policy-makers to look at the elements of current global governance and 
the actual governance of the G20. An inclusive approach to some of the 
key policies within the G20 will also ensure greater ownership of the 
policy directions that the G20 promotes and hence more connection 
between the grassroots and the policy-makers within the G20. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The Turkish Presidency has emphasised that with the G20 members 
having agreed to undertake the Brisbane Action Plan and the thousand 
or so commitments that it entails, 2015 will be a year of doing as 
opposed to talking; a year of policy implementation.7 Prime Minister 
Davotoglu explained: “Now is the time to act. As the G20 Chair, Turkey 
                                                
5 G20 Australia Summit Brisbane, Introductions and Leaders' Perspectives: Building the 
World We Want to Live In, Newsdesk Media, November 2014. 
6 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014. 
7 G20 Australia Summit Brisbane, Introductions and Leaders' Perspectives: Building the 
World We Want to Live In.  
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will spare no effort in fulfilling its critical responsibilities, to steer the 
platform so that we achieve our ambitious targets.”8 
This may entail consideration of the ways in which the G20 can improve 
its executive power and the coordination of the actions of its constituent 
members throughout the year. There are a number of challenges with 
respect to the decision-making process within the G20. The actual 
policies to be implemented may take some time to be achieved. 
Secondly the decisions made at the G20 are not nationally binding and it 
is up to member countries to adopt them, generally if it fits into their 
national priorities and agenda. The current G20 ‘peer review’ policy is 
not an effective mechanism to enforce policy agreements or 
recommendations. Moshirian highlighted the evolution of regional and 
global institutions and the way these new institutions tend to refine and 
improve their operations.9 Moshirian also highlighted the way 
systemically important financial institutions should be supervised and 
their operation globally coordinated.10 In relation to the progress and 
initiatives made in the 2014 Summit, Christine Lagarde, Managing 
Director of the IMF, commented that: “Implementation is now critical, with 
a strong accountability framework to monitor progress, supported by the 
IMF.” Lagarde points to an IMF-supported accountability framework to 
ensure that all members see their commitments through with “decisive 
policy action.”11 While the IMF’s push for a more accountable framework 
is noteworthy, a number of global and regional issues may well distract 
some of the members from the key policy decisions of the G20. With the 
exception of 2008 and 2009 when member countries coordinated well to 
ensure that the world economy would not experience another Great 
Depression, the track record of the G20 since then has not always been 
effective. The push by Turkey to highlight accountability and promote 
more effective coordination amongst member countries is an important 
step towards a more refined and effective operation of the G20.  
INVESTMENT 
The Turkish Presidency has demonstrated a desire to focus on 
investment to drive growth and increase employment, and has 
referenced the OECD estimate that $US70 trillion of global infrastructure 
                                                
8 World Bulletin News, "Turkish Presidency of G20 Focuses on Action for All," World 
Bulletin, 2 December 2014. 
9 Fariborz Moshirian, “The global financial crisis and the evolution of markets, 
institutions and regulation.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 502-511, 2011. 
10 Fariborz Moshirian, “The future and dynamics of global systemically important banks,” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 2675-2679, 2012. 
11 International Monetary Fund, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde Welcomes 
G20 Growth Strategies, Says Implementation Critical, Press Release, 16 November 
2014, IMF. 
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investment will be required over the next 15 years.12 This will involve 
addressing investment gaps and bottlenecks through the development 
and implementation of investment strategies.  
The Prime Minister of Turkey has called for development banks to 
enhance the degree of cooperation amongst themselves. He has also 
demonstrated support for Australia's 2014 emphasis on promoting 
greater private sector investment, and to achieve this, has encouraged 
the development of “alternative and innovative financial instruments.”13 
In order to enhance private sector investment it is likely that attention will 
be drawn to the need to “improve the investment climate” and generate 
greater confidence in the global financial system, amongst 
corporations.14 An environment of increased financial stability may be 
required to encourage the private sector to invest, particularly in 
infrastructure and SMEs. The focus on SMEs has been explained by the 
fact that SMEs, in many countries, are the “primary engines for growth 
and job creation” and, as such, the Turkish Presidency seeks to 
encourage their growth by enhancing their financing opportunities.15 
Turkey has urged the establishment of a World SME Forum by the 
International Chamber of Commerce in order to develop a forum in 
which SMEs can voice their concerns to members of the Business20 
and G20.16 The Turkish Presidency has also indicated that they will 
place great emphasis on non-traditional lending sources, including 
equity-based financing and New Modalities of Asset Based Financing.  
Since the recent global financial crisis, many large companies have 
accumulated a significant amount of assets and cash that could be 
invested for productive purposes, such as investment in infrastructure. 
However, one of the key conditions for the private sector to invest more 
is the state of the global financial system and its soundness. Large 
multinational companies are far more cautious in their investment 
strategies, given the slow recovery of the large US and Euro-zone 
economies and the unsettled political climate in major parts of the world. 
Furthermore, global policies that could minimise global systemic risk and 
ensure a more stable global financial market will be crucial for the private 
sector to take more risk and expand its investment activities. Arnold, 
                                                
12 G20 Australia Summit Brisbane, Introductions and Leaders' Perspectives: Building 
the World We Want to Live In. 
13 Tristram Sainsbury, "Turkey Sets Its G20 Agenda for 2015." G20 Australia Summit 
Brisbane, Introductions and Leaders' Perspectives: Building the World We Want to Live 
In. 
14 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014. 
15 G20 Australia Summit Brisbane, Introductions and Leaders' Perspectives: Building 
the World We Want to Live In. 
16 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014. 
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Borio, Ellis, and Moshirian and Ellis, Haldane, and Moshirian highlighted 
the role of good governance and policies promoting financial stability and 
the need to contain global systemic risk as essential to creating an 
environment more conducive to private sector investment.17 The private 
sector should be reassured that some of the G20’s current policies to 
restructure the foundations of the global financial system are working 
and capital can readily move to where the marginal rate of return is high 
enough without fear of uncertainty. The role of SMEs will be crucial and 
more attention to this sector has great potential to create significant new 
jobs and increase economic activity. Therefore, “Investment” should be 
used as a way of highlighting the interdependence of investment with a 
number of financial and economic issues including the current 
international financial architecture, the soundness of banking systems, 
good management of shadow banks and money market funds.18 
Information sharing about promising infrastructure projects around the 
world that could offer a high rate of return and be sustainable would be 
crucial. A more coordinated approach in this area amongst some key 
institutions, including amongst development banks, the private sector, 
host governments, and investment banks would be essential. 
                                                
17 Bruce Arnold, Claudio Borio, Luci Ellis and Fariborz Moshirian, “Systemic Risk, Basel 
III, Financial Stability and Regulation,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 3123-3124, 
2012; and Luci Ellis, Andrew Haldane, and Fariborz Moshirian, “Systemic risk, 
governance and global financial stability,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 45, 175-181, 
2014. 
18 Fariborz Moshirian, “Global governance: Global banks and shadow bank 
supervision,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 45, 307-311, 2014. 
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COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND 
THE G20: THE 2 DEGREE 
TARGET, STRANDED ASSETS, 
AND EXPLORATION 
SUBSIDIES 
BARRY CARIN1 
 
“….subsidies that encourage fossil fuel exploration are the 
greatest culprits, creating incentives for corporations to continue 
to find new oil, gas, and coal reserves when proven reserves 
are already three times the amount that can be safely burned.” 
Overseas Development Institute 
Governments would not subsidise exploration activity to add to 
carcinogenic asbestos reserves. Governments would not subsidise the 
manufacture of additional tobacco products. The puzzling fact is that 
government’s treatment of fossil fuels ignores the atmosphere’s limited 
capacity to absorb CO2 emissions.  
In psychology the term cognitive dissonance refers to the mental stress 
experienced by an individual who holds two or more contradictory beliefs 
or ideas. G20 governments appear to suffer no discomfort embracing 
conflicting behaviors: 
• The G20 has accepted the target of a global warming limit of 2 
degrees Celsius (relative to pre-industrial levels) 
• The 2 degree target implies a cumulative global quota or budget of 
CO2 emissions between now and 2050 
• No more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be 
consumed prior to 2050, if the world is to achieve the consensus 2 
degree goal.2 
• The G20 have repeatedly endorsed the elimination of inefficient fossil 
fuel subsidies 
• Yet the G20 spends almost $US50 billion a year subsidising 
exploration activity to add to proven fossil fuel reserves 
                                                
1 Senior Fellow, Center for International Governance Innovation. 
2 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2012. 
 THE G20 AT THE END OF 2014 
 
66  
 
Scientists have long argued that continued reliance on fossil fuels would 
eventually destabilise the climate. In 2010, in Cancun, governments 
agreed that emissions need to be constrained so that global temperature 
increases are limited to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels to 
avoid dangerous climate change.3 G20 governments have repeatedly 
endorsed this target. If all already proven reserves were burned, 
atmospheric CO2 would rise to more than 700 ppm, guaranteeing the 2 
degree target will be exceeded.4 
Uncertainties complicate estimates of CO2 emissions consistent with the 
2 degree target. There is uncertainty with respect to future economic 
activity, the energy mix, the energy intensity of that activity, and the 
impact of land use changes. Another uncertainty is the ability of the 
climate system to continue to absorb carbon dioxide through land and 
ocean sinks. Potential positive feedbacks (such as melting permafrost as 
temperatures increase) are unclear. “The collective policy implication of 
these uncertainties is that a precautionary allowance may need to be 
made when considering an emissions budget for a given temperature 
limit: this would invariably lower the amount of allowable emissions from 
human activities.”5 
Using conservative assumptions, the quota or budget for global fossil 
fuel emissions between 2015 and 2050, for a 50 per cent chance6 of not 
exceeding the 2 degree target is somewhere in the range of 1000 to 
1500 GtCO2.7 More than 3000 GtCO2 are embedded in proven 
reserves.8 The Carbon Tracker Initiative estimates as much as 80 per 
cent of coal, oil, and gas reserves of private companies (such as Exxon 
Mobil and Peabody Coal) are now ‘unburnable’ potentially ‘stranded’ 
assets.9 
                                                
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Background on the 
UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change,” 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php, accessed December 2014. 
4 Hans-Holger Rogner, “An Assessment of World Hydrocarbon Resources,” Annual 
Review Energy and Environment, 22:217–62, 1997. 
5 Australian Government Climate Change Authority, Global Emissions Budget Expert 
Roundtable Summary, June 2013. 
6 Bill McKibben would not agree that accepting a 50 per cent probability is reasonable, 
comparing it to the odds of “playing Russian roulette with a six-shooter.” Bill McKibben, 
“Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” Rolling Stone, 19 July 2012. 
7 Emissions from land use changes and from GHGs other than CO2 historically have 
been about 20 per cent of fossil fuel emissions. See Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research, "On the Way to Phasing out Emissions: More than 50% Reductions 
Needed by 2050 to Respect 2°C Climate Target,” media release, 30 April 2009; and 
Malte Meinshausen, Nicolai Meinshausen, William Hare, Sarah C. B. Raper, Katja 
Frieler, Reto Knutti, David J. Frame, and Myles R. Allen, “Greenhouse-Gas Emission 
Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C,” Nature 458, 1158-1162, 2009. 
8 Future levels of “proven” reserves vary with the price of oil. 
9 Carbon Tracker Initiative, available at http://www.carbontracker.org/resources/, 
accessed December 2014. 
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At the Pittsburgh G20 Summit in 2009, the G20 committed to phase out 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. The G20’s 2013 Saint Petersburg 
Declaration and the Brisbane Leaders’ communiqué reaffirmed the 
commitment. However G20 governments continue to subsidise 
exploration for fossil fuels by spending $US88 billion every year through 
investment by state-owned enterprises of around $US49 billion; direct 
spending and tax breaks of $US23 billion; and public finance from banks 
and financial institutions that amounts to another $US16 billion per 
year.10 
Two recommendations seem clear. The G20 should agree to 
immediately phase out exploration subsidies as a first step towards 
dealing with their intent to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. In 
addition, the G20 should agree that their financial institutions and the 
Multilateral Development Banks and sovereign wealth funds should 
discourage investment in fossil fuel exploration and immediately 
eliminate its subsidies. Otherwise the G20 should acknowledge that the 
2 degree (or even a 4 degree) target is in the rear view mirror and should 
prepare the world for adaptation to a higher temperature increase. 
                                                
10 The Carbon Tracker Initiative reports that financial institutions owned by the 
governments of Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia are 
prominent in financing for exploration around the world. Through MDBs, the G20 
provided an average of $US521 million every year for fossil fuel exploration between 
2010 and 2013. Almost two-thirds of this total originated from the World Bank Group, 
with most of the exploration portfolio in fossil fuels held by the International Finance 
Corporation. 
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REFORMING THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM: ‘PUBLIC GOODS’ 
AND BALANCE OF POWER 
ANTONIO VILLAFRANCA1 
 
Today’s global economic governance system is not representative of the 
actual international balance of economic power. The required 
rebalancing in economic and political power gives rise to an urgent need 
to identify the nature of ‘global public goods’ that countries expect the 
global financial and monetary system to provide. 
G20 Declarations — especially the last one in Brisbane — made it clear 
that the main objective recognised by all participants is the attainment of 
strong, stable, and balanced economic growth. In order to achieve this 
goal a number of ancillary tasks have consistently appeared in such 
Declarations between 2008 and 2014. Among them, one should include 
the use of national monetary policies (in such a way as to make 
domestic objectives consistent with stable and balanced international 
capital and trade flows), fiscal sustainability in the long term, preservation 
of an open global economy, and reform of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
These tasks appear to be listed without a clear-cut and coherent ranking. 
However, if all the listed objectives are conceived as subservient to the 
overarching goal of ensuring global economic growth, it is urgent that 
they are pursued with a consistent strategy, a clear timetable, and an 
effective monitoring mechanism.  
As a result, the very rationale behind the redistribution of power in 
international institutions should be turned upside down. First, the current 
and prospective contribution of each country to the provision of global 
“public goods” should be gauged, and then votes/quotas in international 
institutions should be re-distributed accordingly.  
In this view, it is noteworthy that at the 2008 Washington summit, G20 
leaders found that “inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated 
macroeconomic policies” were at the root of the crisis. Given that fiscal 
policies coordination is not in sight, at least in the near future, the 
question then arises: is global coordination of monetary policies feasible, 
or even desirable? 
                                                
1 Head of the European Program and Senior Research Fellow, Italian Institute for 
International Political Studies (ISPI). 
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A way to address this question is to consider how rapidly the 
conventional wisdom about monetary matters has evolved since the 
beginning of the global crisis. Until 2007, central banks tended to treat 
bubbles with benign neglect: they were hard to detect and harder to 
deflate, so better to leave them alone. Today, no central bank would 
admit to such benign neglect any longer. 
A related debate has to do with the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Two starkly different views, stemming from very different theoretical 
traditions, seem to be defending the very same argument, i.e. that 
monetary policy is largely ineffective in the face of looming 
macroeconomic imbalances of a global scale. However, these still-open 
debates in the scholarly community frequently spill over to the 
policymaking community as well. International leaders find themselves at 
cross purposes over the conduct of monetary policy, and it is not 
infrequent that they accuse each other about whether to take a certain 
decision or do nothing. In short, G20 leaders should commit to further 
study of monetary issues in order to clarify what objectives of monetary 
policy should be pursued and, in doing so, they should keep in mind that 
coordination of monetary policies is a “public good” to be defended. 
In addition, as far as the so-called global currencies are concerned, G20 
countries have been debating at length the role they play in the 
international monetary system. Supporters of the reduction of global 
imbalances have long advocated for selected currencies to play a more 
dynamic role, thus switching from a US dollar-dominated world to a 
“multipolar reserve currency system.” This call is usually complemented 
with the request to improve the role of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) as a reserve currency. 
The current IMF criterion for including currencies in the SDR basket is 
their relative importance in the world’s trading and financial systems. 
According to the global financial transactions system, SWIFT, by the end 
of 2013 the yuan was the eighth most traded currency in the world. 
However, the yuan still accounts for little more than 1.5 per cent of global 
payments. Unless new criteria for the SDR composition are agreed 
upon, current calls for the yuan to enter the SDR basket practically imply 
that Beijing’s currency would not count for much more than 2 per cent. 
This also entails that the Australian dollar, the Swiss franc, and the 
Canadian dollar should be taken into account when computing the SDR 
value and would count more than the yuan. In sum, current financial and 
monetary conditions do not seem to fully support a more relevant 
Chinese role in the international system. 
If, on the one hand, global coordination of monetary policies seems to be 
far off in the horizon, on the other hand, a collective contribution to the 
stability of currency markets appears feasible and desirable. Our 
proposal is that the more countries agree to take up a role on global 
currency markets, contributing to its reform and stability, the more they 
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should be ‘rewarded’ in terms of their place in global economic 
governance institutions. 
Recent IMF reforms may turn out to be insufficient if compared to the 
shift in economic power that has occurred in the last two decades. The 
current reforms imply just a 5.6 per cent global realignment in terms of 
quotas, and an even slimmer 5.4 per cent realignment in voting shares. 
Advanced economies would lose some ground, but would still retain 
57.6 per cent of quota shares (and 55.2 per cent of the votes). 
Moreover, at Seoul it was agreed that IMF reforms should be in place by 
November 2012. But, as of December 2014, they are yet to be ratified by 
the US Congress, and this is delaying the start of the next round of IMF 
reforms. 
The current deadlock is understandably frustrating, especially for BRICS 
countries. Although BRICS are a heterogeneous group of countries, the 
mere fact that they managed to agree upon alternative institutions — i.e. 
the recently created New Development Bank — is of legitimate concern 
for those interested in assessing the state of global governance 
institutions. 
In our opinion, G20 countries should prioritise objectives and act upon 
the recognition that their main mission is to increase the growth potential 
of the world economy, while at the same time guaranteeing its 
sustainability. Furthermore, they should strive to agree on what policies 
are best suited to reach this aim, given that the consensus over how to 
address monetary and currency issues is nowadays consolidated, at 
least in some areas. 
In addition, G20 leaders should reach a political agreement over country-
specific priorities, with clear timetables and a monitoring mechanism. 
From this perspective, the reform of Bretton Woods institutions should 
be directly linked to the achievement of country-specific priorities.  
The rationale is that the more a country contributes to the provision of 
‘global public goods’, the more it should benefit from voice and 
representation in the institutions. 
By establishing alternative institutions to the World Bank and the IMF, an 
effort should be made by BRICS countries to design such institutions as 
regional complements, not as direct competitors. The best way to go 
beyond the current formal balance of power within the Bretton Woods 
institutions is to push harder for their reform, not for their replacement. 
These recommendations are ambitious and their implementation may 
prove anything but easy. However, a key concern of G20 leaders should 
be to avoid the fate of a paralysis of international institutions and, at the 
same time, prevent a ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect. These results may be, in 
the long run, beneficial to no one.
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GROWTH THROUGH 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
YONG WANG AND GREGORY CHIN1 
 
China will host the G20 in 2016, after Turkey in 2015. These two nations 
have a good opportunity to advance the infrastructure investment 
agenda that was announced at the G20 Brisbane in 2014. By helping to 
forge a more globally coordinated and coherent effort on infrastructure 
development, the G20 members will help to catalyse strong, sustainable, 
and balanced growth. 
GLOBAL SLOWDOWN 
The global economy could be facing a significant slowdown as the main 
drivers of growth coming out of the 2008-09 financial crisis appear to be 
entering into a period of lower growth themselves. The Chinese 
economy is slowing down to a new normal. Oil prices are crashing and 
Russia is suffering, as seen in the devaluation of the ruble. Europe 
continues to struggle with recession, and there are warnings of a new 
debt crisis. The United States is showing signs of recovery, but 
employment and quality jobs remain a widespread concern at the 
everyday level. Growth in Canada and Australia are slowing as global 
energy and commodity prices weaken. 
The world needs better arrangements for managing global growth and 
development. We appear to be entering into a new period of urgency 
and crisis prevention.  
One way to stave off a global slowdown would be to stimulate growth in 
the real economy via infrastructure investment. One of the key outcomes 
of the G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia, is the attention given to 
infrastructure investment, and the decision to set up a new Sydney-
based “global infrastructure hub” as a virtual and physical base for 
sharing data and knowledge between companies, governments, and 
financiers that are looking to support infrastructure projects.  
Another positive outcome of the Australian G20 Presidency was the 
strong work that Australia put into coordinating with Turkey and China, 
the next two hosts of the G20 summit. Australian officials also made sure 
                                                
1 Yong Wang, Professor of School of International Studies and Director of the Center for 
International Political Economy, Peking University; and Gregory Chin, Associate 
Professor of Political Science, York University, Canada. 
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to link the agenda of the Brisbane G20 Summit to that of the APEC 
Leaders’ Summit in Beijing, which took place immediately prior to the 
G20. The respective hosts of the APEC and G20 Summits each made 
sure to focus on the economy, and both gave priority to infrastructure 
investment on the Summit agendas.  
WHY INFRASTRUCTURE  
Investment in infrastructure can be a key means for offsetting the 
slowdown in global growth, and a direct channel for surplus countries to 
direct excess financial resources to less-developed countries and 
regions, as well as to developed countries in need of infrastructure 
upgrades.  
Infrastructure development is a precondition for sustained growth in 
developing countries. Yet there are major gaps in infrastructure financing 
globally, and especially in the developing world. According to the African 
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and ADB, 
there is huge demand for infrastructure investment across their regions.  
Some of the traditional leading economies, including the United States 
and Britain, have identified infrastructure modernisation as a priority for 
the future. The Obama White House has made infrastructure a priority 
for 2015, but it is facing resistance in Congress. 
Increasing investment in infrastructure would also be a means to 
rebalance the global economy, and to reduce its over-reliance on the 
virtual economy and financial innovation.  
The Turkish G20 Presidency can make an important contribution to 
strong, inclusive, sustainable, and balanced growth by maintaining the 
focus on infrastructure investment, and by helping to forge a more 
globally coordinated and coherent agenda on infrastructure financing. 
It is a good sign that Turkey has made “inclusive growth” and 
“infrastructure investment” top priorities for the upcoming 2015 G20 
Summit.2 As a demonstration of its seriousness, Turkey will host the 
Investment and Infrastructure Working Group Meeting on 29-30 January 
2015, as one of the first working group meetings under the new G20 
President — immediately after the Framework Working Group meeting. 
FOR CHINA’S G20 PRESIDENCY 
China has heavy interest in a global discussion on infrastructure 
investment.  
                                                
2 Turkish G20 Presidency, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, 1 December 
2014. 
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In 2012, the BRICS countries initiated the idea of establishing a new 
intra-BRICS development bank, and this bank was launched in July 
2014. Also in 2014, China advanced the idea of a new Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank.3 In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
proposed the idea of “one belt, one road” to reconnect the countries of 
the original Silk Road across the Eurasian landmass; but, this time, with 
new rapid transportation lines. Beijing offered new financing for “Silk 
Road” projects, including for the creation of a $US40 billion Silk Road 
Fund, and also additional financing for a Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization Bank. The Chinese Government has been consulting with 
the nations involved, and it has the means to finance these various 
infrastructure projects. The implementation of these plans will contribute 
to growth in the region, and beyond, over the next decade. 
However, in assuming the G20 Presidency for 2016, China has a unique 
opportunity to foster some needed coordination and coherence between 
the various international infrastructure initiatives that were vying for 
attention at the Brisbane G20 summit, including the World Bank’s Global 
Infrastructure Facility and the Asian Development Bank.  
Global infrastructure financing demand still outstrips the supply, despite 
the burgeoning of institutional arrangements. The G20 member states 
should work together to forge a global agenda for global infrastructure 
development; and, in so doing, forge strong, sustained, and balanced 
global growth. 
                                                
3 Yong Wang and Gregory Chin, “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Prospects 
for a China-led Institution,” Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (blog), 31 July 
2014, http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/07/31/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/. 
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SYDNEY THINK20 SEMINAR 
OCTOBER 2014 
TRISTRAM SAINSBURY1  
INTRODUCTION 
On 28 October 2014, the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy hosted a Think20 seminar in Sydney. The Think20 
involves representatives from think tanks drawn from G20 countries. It is 
a relatively new addition to the G20’s formal outreach with the broader 
community. Since the G20 reached out to business representatives at 
the Toronto Summit in 2009, the G20’s formal engagement has 
expanded to involve five engagement groups: business (B20); civil 
society (C20); organised labour (L20); think tanks and the academic 
community (Think20 or T20); and young people (Y20).2  
The first Think20 meeting took place in February 2012 and was 
organised by the Mexican G20 Presidency in collaboration with 
COMEXI, the Mexican Council of Foreign Relations. Russia continued 
the process when it assumed the G20 Presidency for 2013, with a 
Think20 meeting organised in December 2012 by the Russian 
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. 
The Australian Presidency also supported the Think20, appointing the 
G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for International Policy to 
coordinate the 2014 Think20 process. During the Australian Presidency, 
Think20 events have become formalised, the Think20 network has been 
strengthened, Think20 meetings and seminars organised more 
frequently, and expectations have increased for experts from think tanks 
and the academic community to contribute to G20 efforts to improve the 
global economy.  
The October 2014 seminar, the final meeting Think20 convened during 
the Australian Presidency, consisted of four sessions. Session 1 
assessed major challenges facing the global economy, risks to global 
growth, and whether the G20’s 2 per cent growth target will be a ‘game 
changer’. Session 2 considered whether global economic cooperation is 
on the rise or in decline, the consequences of delays in IMF governance 
reform and at the WTO, and implications of rising geopolitical tensions. 
Session 3 was devoted to whether the G20 operates as the premier 
forum for economic cooperation, assessing how the G20 has progressed 
                                                
1 Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. The 
summary reflects the impressions of the author, and any errors or omissions are mine.  
2 A prospective sixth group focussing on gender issues, the Women’s 20 (W20), was 
being discussed in late 2014. 
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in 2014, and exploring the challenges confronting Turkey as chair in 
2015. Finally, Session 4 examined the role of the Think20: its 
contributions to the G20 process, how it compares with the other G20 
‘engagement partners’, and what can be done to make it more effective. 
The following is a summary of some of the points raised during the 
seminar. 
SESSION 1: THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Session 1 set the scene for the seminar by discussing the economic 
backdrop that would underpin discussions at the Leaders’ Summit in 
Brisbane. It was suggested that the major challenges facing the global 
economy have moved on dramatically from the Russian Presidency. In 
early 2013, the topical issues were fiscal consolidation, currency wars, 
energy prices, and trade protectionism.  
Today the story is very different. One point raised was that global growth 
remains disappointing with many countries forecast to grow below their 
potential growth rates combined with downward revisions in their growth 
potential. While the emerging markets had been the growth engine since 
the crisis, emerging market growth rates had declined from around 7 per 
cent to around 5 per cent. Growth rates in advanced economies had 
also weakened over the course of 2014 and there is discussion about 
secular stagnation. 
There is also a marked slowdown in convergence of the growth 
performance between advanced economies and emerging markets. It 
was noted that convergence trends are still there, but at a reduced rate 
relative to the 2000s. Moreover there was a sense conveyed that 
notwithstanding the very rapid growth in emerging markets in recent 
years, associated with globalisation and the information revolution, these 
high compound growth rates will be very difficult to maintain.  
There is also a loss of momentum in global trade. Historically, global 
trade grew faster than global GDP; however, in recent years global trade 
is growing slower than global production. It was suggested that, in part, 
this reflects the weakening in the global economy, but trade growth itself 
has dropped independently of the economic slowdown. 
It was noted that monetary policy continues to play a prominent and 
potentially disruptive role in economic management. In the US and UK, 
discussions are around the exit from unorthodox monetary policy. In 
contrast, Japan is accelerating its quantitative easing and the European 
Central Bank is edging towards greater stimulus. This divergence in 
monetary policies will have implications for the US dollar and financial 
markets. One point raised was that more work is needed to understand 
the spillovers, and a greater effort is required on international 
cooperation on monetary policy settings. 
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A further observation was that global financial markets have seen a long 
period of what could be termed as being ‘too-quiet’ although there has, 
recently, been a burst of volatility. The concern is that markets are still 
mispricing risk. 
Some country-specific observations include that Chinese growth is 
continuing its path of slowing, although the magnitude and timeframe of 
the slowdown is uncertain. While there have been some predictions of a 
dramatic slowing in the growth of the Chinese economy, it was pointed 
out that it still has a long way to go to catch up to the wealth levels of 
advanced economies. It was noted that at a sustained 5 per cent per 
annum growth rate, China will reach OECD wealth levels in 2050. To 
maintain higher growth, productivity will have to be increased and this, in 
turn, will require structural reform.  
India faces challenging structural reforms. A potential approach is for 
India to use the international financial institutions to promote reform. 
However, it was suggested that the international organisations currently 
do not have sufficient leverage in India to achieve such an outcome. 
Instead, reform will have to be internally driven.  
Against this backdrop, the challenge is how to increase sustained global 
economic growth. The infrastructure agenda was seen to be a key area, 
but reforms needed to go beyond infrastructure investment and cover all 
policy areas, including monetary policy and fiscal policy. A common 
theme in the policies recommended by the IMF and OECD was the need 
for a greater emphasis on social aspects of growth. 
Adding 2 per cent to the projected level of G20 country GDP may be 
tough but it was viewed as achievable. Structural reforms will be key 
drivers of growth, but these are country specific, raising questions about 
the role for the G20. 
It was suggested that while the growth target may be a crude instrument, 
it has communication value in that it allows leaders to signal that a) there 
is a problem; and b) they can do something about it. It also provides a 
performance benchmark against which countries can be assessed. 
Questions were raised about whether the target was ambitious enough 
— a more modest target may be good for the EU but not enough for the 
global economy. More generally, structural reforms are slow-acting 
reforms that create winners and losers, and although countries can do 
these unilaterally (and there are examples of this being successful) peer 
pressure may be needed to affect change. It was considered to be a 
good thing if the G20 can provide peer pressure/review to generate 
additional commitments from countries.  
An alternative take was that country-specific policies should simply be 
left for countries to implement. The recent IMF downgrade to growth 
projections (both near and medium term) shows the challenges in 
meeting the task, and implementation risks raise serious questions about 
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whether the 2 per cent target can be achieved. Further, doubts were 
raised as to whether, as a structural process, the G20 can be helpful in 
overcoming domestic political roadblocks.  
The view was raised that the value of the 2 per cent growth target comes 
from the nature of the signal that leaders are sending. If the target is 
connected with medium- to long-term benchmarks then there may be 
value. But leaders have to take it seriously, specify the sources of growth 
and hold themselves accountable. For summits to be effective, 
behaviours have to change. There also needs to be a pledge from all 
members within the forum to not publicly detract from the target. Finally, 
expectations need to be carefully managed, as the 2 per cent target 
cannot be seen as the answer to everything.  
SESSION 2: THE STATE OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE 
In this session, participants’ focus turned to the current state of global 
economic governance. There were concerns that the evidence 
suggested global economic governance is in decline. In a stark (but 
possible) global scenario, it was suggested that the state of multilateral 
organisations and forums in a year’s time could involve:  
• IMF: Not reformed from the continuing deadlock in the US  
• World Trade Organization: Not reformed from the continuing 
deadlock 
• World Health Organization: Still lacking the mandate and resources 
to do its job effectively, and no clear process for reforming 
arrangements for dealing with health emergencies 
• BRICS New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB): unresolved as to how these institutions fit with the 
existing international structure 
• United National Framework Convention on Climate Change: Another 
disappointing climate change conference in Paris, after receiving no 
direction from G20 leaders 
• Post 2015 Millennium Development Goals: No strong, clear outcome 
• Tax: edging slowly towards the establishment of an international tax 
organisation that could manage country-by-country reporting on 
international tax issues 
In addition it was suggested topics like development, sovereign debt 
restructuring and immigration are cross-border issues and there may be 
no real progress in pursuing these issues in international forums.  
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Problems in areas such as the Bali trade agreement and IMF reform 
have contributed to the development of blocs and factions among the 
international community, particularly the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa). In addition to the BRICS, there is the G7 
(US, Canada, Germany, UK, Japan, France, and Italy), and the recent 
grouping MITKA (Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, Korea, and Australia). 
Concern was expressed that blocs or factions may work against 
achieving the global economic cooperation that is required. Such blocs 
may impede achieving the compromises that are often needed to 
advance international issues.  
In particular, attention has been drawn to the BRICS grouping, which 
has been united by its frustration with the established global order. This 
has led to the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank and 
the currency reserve pool. In addition, China has launched the AIIB. 
These arrangements have commonly been described as a challenge to 
the established order.  
The BRICS New Development Bank was viewed as more of a 
geopolitical statement than an economic one, with the money at stake 
relatively small compared to development needs. The state of events is 
partly due to the grouping being less united on how they specifically wish 
to go against the established order, and the grouping will face ongoing 
challenges on how to sustain cooperation.  
It was recognised that the new institution faces many problems. For 
example, South Africa insisted on equal votes in the BRICS New 
Development Bank, which will constrain the growth potential of the 
bank’s resources. The opportunity cost for the funds coming from the 
South African taxpayer is significant.  
It is not clear what role the currency pool will play for each member, and 
indeed what benefit there is from the arrangement. However, it was 
suggested that the driving force behind its establishment was the failure 
to pass IMF reform. And the longer necessary reforms to the IMF, 
agreements at the WTO etc, are delayed, the more of a lightning rod 
these delays will be for fast-tracking the progress of alternative 
arrangements.  
The current Chinese approach to international institutions is not defined 
by its status as a major power, but rather as an emerging market. The 
view was expressed that China recognises that, like the other BRICS, it 
is a non-Western power that has no choice but to negotiate with Western 
powers over Western-dominated global institutions like the IMF and 
World Bank. In this context, regional/cross-regional initiatives are viable 
alternatives. Further, China’s approach to participation in the existing 
structures of regional arrangements is influenced by a perceived lack of 
trust from existing powers, as well as competing priorities. For example, 
the AIIB offers the potential to promote Chinese interests and domestic 
priorities in the Asian region in a way that, due to constraints, the ADB 
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and World Bank cannot, and China believes that it has expertise in 
infrastructure.  
It was noted that the existing and new arrangements have the potential 
to be complementary, and it was highlighted that the ADB President has 
welcomed the AIIB as an additional source of funding for infrastructure in 
the Asian region. Although the AIIB and BRICS arrangements will not kill 
multilateralism, they raise questions around the effectiveness of 
groupings like the G20. Moreover, it was suggested that history has 
demonstrated that multilateral arrangements have to be demonstrably 
useful if they are to endure.  
SESSION 3: THE STATE OF THE G20 
This session focused on how the G20 has progressed since 2008. It was 
suggested that there has been a formalisation of the G20 since the 
global financial crisis as the key forum for global economic cooperation, 
with continuous work by a taskforce on global economic challenges. 
Further, the habits of cooperation are improving through regular 
cooperation between officials involved in G20 Working Groups. 
There was a widespread view that the G20’s legitimacy as the premier 
forum for resolving global economic governance issues has declined as 
the immediacy of the crisis has waned. People are disillusioned and 
increasingly cynical as the forum delivers slower and lower levels of 
progress. It was remarked that if another financial crisis were to occur in 
the near future, there would be serious image issues for the forum. 
That said, the G20 with its narrower focus in 2014 is still relevant, and 
the world would be in a worse position if the forum were not in existence. 
A point raised was that governments need to cooperate and the G20 can 
play a very positive ongoing role, building on successes such as in 
financial regulation and the standstill on protectionism. It is still maturing, 
and non-G8 countries are still listening and learning about how to steer 
global affairs. 
In many respects the G20 is now in a second phase following the initial 
response to the crisis, and is now focusing on lifting the potential growth 
rate of countries that were adversely affected by the crisis. In this regard, 
the 2 per cent target can provide the forum with much-needed 
momentum. However, some participants noted that this is an area where 
countries have divergent interests and involves country-specific policy 
settings. 
The point was raised that in order to make advances in international 
economic governance, all the long-term issues with multilateral 
organisations and forums noted above should be on the G20 agenda. A 
focused agenda including these items does not necessarily need to 
address country-specific actions.  
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It was recognised, however, that some of those issues are extremely 
tough to solve. For example, it is difficult to be optimistic about the future 
of the WTO. The key challenge facing the G20 is to mobilise the political 
momentum for reform while managing expectations and achieving the 
right balance between ambition and realism. 
There was a widespread view that the Australian Presidency has 
delivered a functional process that has contributed to improvements in 
the habits of cooperation. Reports from officials in G20 countries noted 
improvements in managing time, the length of speeches, and the 
relevancy of discussions. Important characteristics that have been 
maintained have been the peer-to-peer conversations and informality of 
interactions.  
The Australian Presidency’s approach has been energetic. Outreach has 
been extensive. For example, efforts have been made to bring the 
perspectives of developing countries into the G20’s work on combatting 
tax evasion and avoidance. 
There have been efforts by Australia to improve interactions with the 
engagement groups. The B20 has had unprecedented influence over 
the G20 chair in 2014. A challenge for Turkey in 2015 will be to further 
enhance the involvement of all the engagement partners.  
In general, it was noted that there is a lack of public understanding of the 
G20. People don’t know what the forum does. In the eyes of the 
Australian public, the main G20 issues are likely to involve the 
interactions between Prime Minister Abbott and President Putin. As 
regards media interest in the G20 in Canada, there has been one recent 
television news item, about protestors camping out several weeks ahead 
of the event.  
That said, Australia has done comparatively well in setting out clear 
objectives for the G20 in 2014. In particular, the BEPS agenda has cut 
through in terms of Australian media interest in the G20. 
The G20’s rotating Chair and increases in the expenses of hosting the 
G20 puts pressure on the Chair for the Summit to achieve major 
outcomes. While the rotating Chair is unlikely to change, it was 
considered that the G20 process has to evolve from being a ‘once in a 
career event’ for the Chair to a meeting that comprehensively and 
consistently advances multi-year issues. 
The likelihood of a 2016 Chinese G20 Presidency is shaping up to be an 
important point in the G20’s evolution. In the past, the approach by 
China to the G20 has included a willingness to play the part of a good 
global citizen, although it has not taken actions that are considered 
detrimental to national interest but would benefit the global economy 
overall.  
 THE G20 AT THE END OF 2014 
 
81
 
The point was made that there are reasons to be optimistic about 
China’s chairing of the G20 in 2016 because it will require China to focus 
on progressing global outcomes. The US and China have shown a 
willingness to work with each other, and there have been recent 
improvement in relations between China, Japan, and Korea. If these 
relationships continue to strengthen, it can alleviate the tensions 
associated with the lack of trust. 
However, the point was also made that China’s actions in driving the 
various alternative arrangements can also be seen as a mark that is not 
looking to please the international community any longer. And it is 
important to keep in mind the evolving economic discussions and politics 
in China and that it is a sensitive period in terms of its response to the 
international community.  
If the new institutions belie a revealed preference, it is indeed a risk to 
ongoing G20 cooperation and raises the spectre that the geopolitical 
failures of the G8 may also translate across to the G20 in time. If, for 
example, tensions between the US and China result in an invitation to 
the 2016 Leaders’ Summit being withheld from the US President, the 
forum could be irrevocably impacted. 
SESSION 4: THE STATE OF THE THINK20 
The final session turned attention towards the Think20, and how think 
tanks and the academic community could best input into the G20 
process.  
The Think20 seeks to contribute to the G20 process by providing 
analysis, ideas and commentary. Since the first Think20 outreach in the 
2012 Mexican Presidency, the involvement of engagement groups such 
as the Think20 has become more formalised. The Think20 retains a 
different character to other engagement groups in two important 
respects. First, the other engagement groups advocate specific issues 
and spend considerable time seeking consensus on the issues to be 
progressed. In contrast, the Think20 is not an advocacy group and, 
consistent with its comparative advantage in providing analytical depth 
and ideas, does not seek to achieve agreed positions. Secondly, the 
think tanks and academics involved, who could be described as 
professional G20 observers, provide a degree of continuity that does not 
exist to the same extent with the other, more domestically oriented, 
engagement groups.  
The activities of the Think20 in 2013 and 2014 have included:  
• May 2013: Regional Think20 seminar 
• December 2013: Think20 meeting involving all G20 countries 
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• December 2013: Publication of the book Think20 papers 2014: Policy 
Recommendations for the Brisbane G20 Summit 
• Publication of 14 editions of the G20 Monitor over the course of 2013 
and 2014, which contained articles covering all issues on the G20 
agenda 
• Think20 representation by the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy 
Institute at various G20 official events throughout 2014. Close 
engagement with the C20, B20, L20, and Y20 
• Conferences, roundtables, and other events across 2013 and 2014 
• October 2014: Think20 seminar 
Some of the lessons from the Think20 experience under the Australian 
Chair include the importance of starting early, recognising that the best 
time to influence the agenda for the G20 is before the country assumes 
the Chair on 1 December. It was also noted that focusing research on 
the areas that are the priority of the Chair is important, as is providing 
specific policy recommendations. The point was also made that an area 
where think tanks have a comparative advantage is in focusing on global 
governance gaps, a topic that is unlikely to receive attention by the other 
engagement groups. 
One point made was that the G20 effectively influences a large 
component of the research agenda of the international organisations in 
terms of the various requests that the G20 directs to these bodies. As 
such, an area the Think20 could focus on is suggesting areas where the 
international bodies could be tasked to undertake work. 
In terms of strengthening the Think20 process, a troika structure similar 
to the governance arrangements of the G20 Presidency was considered 
useful. The Think20 papers 2014 were considered very useful, 
particularly the focus on short papers with specific policy 
recommendations. This process should be continued. It was considered 
that to strengthen the persuasiveness of future Think20 papers, a 
number of joint papers should be produced. In addition, two reviewers 
for each paper could be nominated. It was recognised that to pursue 
such an approach, additional time would have to be factored into the 
production process. 
One suggestion raised was to invite observers from other organisations; 
for example, ACUNS, BRICS academic forum, and ASEM think tanks. 
However, the Think20 process is an open coalition of think tanks and 
there are no restrictions on who attends Think20 meetings. Money has 
been the main limitation.  
One idea raised was to establish an academic G20 journal — although 
how such a publication would be organised or funded was not 
discussed. As noted previously, in 2014 and 2013, the G20 Studies 
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Centre at the Lowy Institute had regularly produced the G20 Monitor that 
consisted of papers from think tanks and academics on G20 issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the seminar provided an insightful discussion around the 
economic and institutional challenges facing global economic 
governance, the G20, and the Think20.  
There seemed to be a general consensus among participants that the 
core focus of international economic discussions is currently on how to 
increase sustained global economic growth, in light of disappointing 
growth in many countries and expectations of lower potential growth into 
the future. As a result the G20 — still considered to be the premier 
multilateral economic forum — is in many respects now into a second 
phase that focuses on lifting growth potential, and countries are forming 
better habits of cooperation. However, its legitimacy appears to be 
declining as people become disillusioned with the G20’s slow progress 
on key international governance issues. A side effect is the development 
of ‘workarounds’ such as alternate regional architecture and geopolitical 
blocs and factions, which will be a key challenge for the Turkish 
Presidency. 
There also appeared to be agreement on the growing significance of the 
Think20. There was broad recognition that the efforts of Mike Callaghan 
and the Lowy Institute’s G20 Studies Centre over a number of years 
constitute a major step forward in realising the vision of the Think20 — to 
allow experts to improve the workings of the global economy. There was 
a sense that by continuing to focus on priority issues for G20 members, 
the Think20 can help to set the direction for research and policy-making 
on a global scale. 
That said, the Think20 initiative is still in its formative phase, and there 
remains significant scope for refinement. Some proposals that future 
hosts may consider include: a formal Think20 troika arrangement that 
mirrors G20 processes; producing more jointly-authored T20 papers; 
establishing an academic G20 journal; strengthening peer review 
mechanisms for contributions; and a greater focus on the future work 
tasks of international bodies. 
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